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ARTICLES
LEARNING TO CRAWL: THE USE OF VOLUNTARY
CAPS ON DAMAGES IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
LITIGATION
Ralph Peeples' and Catherine T.Harris-+
Medical malpractice insurance "crises" seem to recur with distressing
frequency. Indeed, the escalating costs of malpracticeinsurancepremiums
have become the focal point for advocates of tort reform. While we know
quite a bit about the medical malpracticesystem, we know very little about
what might work to fix things. Many reforms have been tried; little has
worked. The two most commonly attempted reforms-at least at presentare legislatively imposed caps on noneconomic damages (i.e., pain and
suffering) and the use of screening panels. Neither of these alternatives
offers a satisfactory resolution to the problem.
This Article proposes the use of voluntary caps, selected (if at all) by the
plaintiff and the plaintiffs attorney. By the use of three separate litigation
"tracks," incentives can be provided for plaintiffs to agree to caps on
damages, while also providing separate inducements for the insurers who
defend malpractice defendants and the physicians that they insure. The
underlying benefit for all would be substantially reduced costs of litigation.
The end result would be improved access to the courtsfor injuredplaintiffs
and a more rationalclaims resolution system.
Legislation implementing the proposal would not be necessary; tailored
discovery scheduling orders would suffice. In a politically charged
climate, broad scale, equitable reform is not likely. Instead, we should
begin a steady movement toward such reform in stages. We need to learn
to crawl, before we can walk.

Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law.
Professor of Sociology, Wake Forest University.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Again we find ourselves in a medical malpractice crisis.' Observers
who follow such things generally agree that the crisis of the early 2000s is
the third such crisis in recent memory. The first appeared in the mid1970s; the second appeared in the mid-1980s.2 The crisis is, by and large,
about the level of malpractice insurance premiums physicians pay. Rates
have increased substantially in the last several years over most of the
country, and the rates have increased for all medical and surgical
specialties.'
Several surgical specialties, including OB-GYN and
orthopedic surgery, have experienced particularly dramatic rate
increases. Beyond the attention paid to rising insurance premiums is the
fear that for at least some specialties in some states, malpractice
insurance is, or will soon become, unavailable
From a concern over
rising insurance rates and diminishing availability of insurance, the next
worry-one of access to health care-comes naturally. Will escalating
premiums lead a substantial number of physicians (OB-GYNs are almost
always used in this sort of argument) to abandon the practice of
1. Some writers prefer to place "crisis" in quotes, suggesting that the problem is a bit
overstated. Certainly there is no shortage of overblown rhetoric in the continuing debate
over medical malpractice reform. It is the position of this Article that the quotation marks
are irrelevant. What matters is that the situation is widely perceived as a crisis, certainly by
physicians and politicians, as well as many others. See, e.g., Bob Herbert, Editorial,
Malpractice Myths, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2004 at A19; John P. McDanicl, Editorial, Triage
for a Crisis in Care, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 2004, at B8; Jack Torry, Bush Slams
Malpractice Lawsuits, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 23, 2004, at Al. A perception this
widespread simply can't be ignored.
2. William M. Sage, Understandingthe FirstMalpractice Crisis of the 21st Century, in
HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 1-4 (Alice G. Gosfield ed., 2003); David M. Studdert et al.,
Medical Malpractice, 350 NEw ENG. J. MED. 283, 284-85 (2004); see also AM. MED. ASS'N,
MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM - NOW! 2 (2004), available at http://www.amaassn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/450/mlrnowdecO32004.pdf;
Kenneth E. Thorpe, The
Medical Malpractice 'Crisis':Recent Trends and the Impact of State Tort Reforms, HEALTH
AFF., Jan. 21, 2004, at W4-20.
3. AM. MED. ASS'N, supra note 2, at 5-6.
4. Thorpe, supra note 2, at 21; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03702, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: MULTIPLE FACTORS HAVE CONTRIBUTED
TO PREMIUM RATE INCREASES 9-10, 13 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d03702.pdf; William P. Gunnar, Is There an Acceptable Answer to Rising
Medical MalpracticePremiums?, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 465, 470-71 (2004).
5. See, e.g., AM. MED. ASS'N, supra note 2, at 4; Sheri Hall, Malpractice Rates Drive
Off Doctors, DET. NEWS, Oct. 25, 2004, at 1A; John Wagner, Malpractice Pinch Has Md.
Doctors Mulling Whether To Wait-or Leave, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2004, at B1; Rachel
Zimmerman & Christopher Oster, Assigning Liability: Insurers' Missteps Helped Provoke
Malpractice 'Crisis,' WALL ST. J., June 24, 2002, at Al; Tanya Albert, Two Illinois Towns
Take Tort Reform into Their Own Hands, AMEDNEWS.COM, Aug. 9, 2004,
http://www.ama-assn.orgamednews/2004/08/09/gvl20809.htm.
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medicine? 6 More precisely, will escalating premiums, or the difficulty in
obtaining insurance, induce a substantial number of physicians practicing
in, say, Pennsylvania or New York or North Carolina7 to move to states
with lower malpractice premiums? Although it may have been an
answer, twenty-five or thirty years ago, for physicians to simply pass
along the increased cost of insurance premiums by increasing the fees
they charge, that option is much less realistic today. In a health care
system dominated by managed care, it has become increasingly difficult
for physicians to simply pass along their higher costs.8 Nor is it an answer
to say to a physician, much as one might to a twenty-three-year-old
driver, that you must simply be more careful, and eventually your rates
will come down. Unlike drivers, physicians within a particular specialty
are usually not "experience-rated." 9

Politicians and editorial writers around the country have all weighed in
with their views about what ought to be done.'0 Inevitably, proposals for

tort reform have appeared at both the federal and state levels." None of
6. See, e.g., Kathleen Kerr, Docs Don't See Future in Babies, NEWSDAY (New
York), Oct. 19, 2004, at A6; News Release, American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, Medical Liability Survey Reaffirms More Ob-Gyns Are Quitting
Obstetrics (July 16, 2004), http://www.acog.org/from-home/publications/press-releases/
nr07-16-04.cfm.
7. AM. MED. ASS'N, AMERICA'S MEDICAL LIABILITY CRISIS: A NATIONAL VIEW,
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/noindex/category/l1871.html (last updated Mar. 15, 2005)
(listing Pennsylvania, New York, and North Carolina as three of the twenty states in a
medical liability "crisis").
8. Michelle M. Mello et al., Caringfor Patients in a Malpractice Crisis: Physician
Satisfaction and Quality of Care, HEALTH AFF., July/Aug. 2004, at 42, 47 (2004); Sage,
supra note 2, at 20; Studdert et al., supra note 2, at 286-87.
9. Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory
and Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1616 (2002); cf PAUL
WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 76-77 (1991). There is some indication,
however, that the long-standing practice of charging one premium for all physicians
practicing in the same specialty, such as general surgeons, or OB-GYNs, is changing. See
David A. Hyman, Medical Malpracticeand the Tort System: What Do We Know and What
(if Anything) Should We Do About It?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1639, 1645 n,18 (2002).
10. See, e.g., Herbert, supra note 1; McDaniel, supra note 1; Torry, supra note 1.
11. Several states (Florida, Idaho, Mississippi, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas, and West
Virginia) enacted cap legislation in 2003 and 2004, limiting the amount of noneconomic
damages a medical malpractice plaintiff may recover, along with various other changes.
NAT'L ASS'N OF MUT. INS. Cos., AN OVERVIEW OF STATE LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS To
IMPROVE THE LEGAL SYSTEM, http://www.namic.org/reports/tortReform/overview.asp
(last updated July 2004). In contrast, in 2004, voters in Oregon and Wyoming defeated
ballot initiatives to impose caps on noneconomic damages. Tanya Albert, State Tort
Reform Ballot Wins Set Stage for Further Battles, AMEDNEWS.COM, Nov. 22/29, 2004,
http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2004/11/22/gvlll122.htm. Meanwhile, Florida voters
approved a constitutional amendment limiting attorney fees in medical malpractice cases.
See id. At the federal level, the House of Representatives passed House Bill 4280, the
Health Act, in May 2004. See Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare
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this is new, of course. It all happened in the mid-1970s, and, to an extent,
the mid-1980s. The fact that a third crisis appeared in the early 2000s
speaks volumes about the effectiveness of the various proposals and
reforms adopted in the past.
To this picture must be added another factor, hardly surprising in
itself, but one that should not be overlooked. Physicians have little use
for the tort liability system as it operates in the United States. One need
only skim the American Medical Association's (AMA) web site 2 for a
quick sense of this. Physicians consistently overestimate their chances of
being sued. 3 In a recent randomized survey of Pennsylvania medical
specialists, 80% of the respondents characterized their malpractice
insurance premiums as either an "extreme burden" or a "major
burden." 4 But beyond the obvious fact that doctors distrust the tort
system in this country, there is a more basic concern. Physicians as a
group doubt the ability of any finder of fact (be it judge, jury, or lawyer)
to determine whether their conduct (their diagnosis, their treatment,
their care in general) was negligent. 5 In fact, it goes deeper than this.
Many physicians are offended by the very idea that a non-physician
might pass judgment on their medical decisions. 6 It is not enough to
acknowledge that "physicians are upset" and then concentrate one's
efforts solely on the economic aspects of the problem. There is more to
it than that. For any "reform" to have any chance of long-term success,
the concerns of physicians-as well as their patients-must be
acknowledged and addressed.
II. WHAT WE KNOW

It is a paradox that while we actually know quite a bit about medical
malpractice, we know very little about what might work to fix it. More
so than most other types of personal injury torts, medical malpractice has
(HEALTH) Act of 2004, H.R. 4280, 108th Cong. (2004), WL 2003 CONG US HR 4280.
One of the key features of the bill was the imposition of a cap on noneconomic damages.
Id. § 4. The Senate, to date, has not approved the bill.
12. AM. MED. ASS'N, http:/fwww.ama-assn.org (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
13. See Ann G. Lawthers et al., Physicians'Perceptionsof the Risk of Being Sued, 17
J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 463, 475 (1992).
14. Mello et al., supra note 8, at 47-48.
15. See CATHERINE T. STRUVE, THE PROJECT ON MED. LIAB. IN PA., EXPERTISE IN
MEDICAL MALPRACI ICE LITIGATION: SPECIAL COURTS, SCREENING PANELS, AND

OTHER OPTIONS 7-8 (2003), available at http://medliabilitypa.org/research/struvel003/
StruveReport.pdf; PAUL WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE 128-29 (1993);

Ralph Peeples et al., Settlement Has Many Faces: Physicians, Attorneys, and Medical
Malpractice, 41 J.HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV, 333, 341-43 (2000).
16. See STRUVE, supra note 15, at 16; Timothy Marjoribanks et al., Physicians'
Discourse on Malpractice and the Meaning of Medical Malpractice, 37 J. HEALTH & SOC.
BEHAV. 163, 167 (1996).
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consistently attracted scholarly attention. Of equal importance, this
scholarly attention has often taken the form of empirical study, as
opposed to case and statutory analysis, or mere theoretical discourse.
Thus we know that most incidents of medical negligence never form the
basis for a claim against the physician, the hospital, or the insurer, much
less a civil lawsuit.'7 Every study on the subject leads to the same
conclusion: much more medical negligence takes place than most people
think."' On the other hand, a large number of ill-founded claims of
medical negligence are made every year, as well.' 9 Thus, the problem is
one of both under-inclusion and over-inclusion.
When lawsuits are filed, the evidence strongly suggests that the tort
liability system does a good job of identifying meritorious cases (i.e.,
those cases involving actual negligence on the part of the physician),
although the identifying and the compensating are typically done in a
very inefficient and costly manner. 20 Almost all empirical studies have
found that compensation is related to a determination of negligence on
the part of the defendant physician. Thus, Danzon examined malpractice
claims closed by California insurers in 1974 and 1976, and concluded that
way.21
in general, the malpractice liability system operated in a rational
Meritorious claims were more likely to be paid than non-meritorious
22
claims. Cheney and others reviewed closed insurance company claims
relating to anesthesiologists and found a clear connection between
Looking at over 8000 closed insurance
negligence and compensation.
files from New Jersey, and examining the assessments of physicianreviewers in those cases, Taragin and others also found that claims were
much more likely to be paid if the physician-reviewers felt the defendant

17. PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 19-29 (1985) (reviewing
California data); see WEILER ET AL., supra note 15, at 137-39 (reviewing New York State
data, as part of the Harvard Medical Practice Study); David M. Studdert et al., Beyond
Dead Reckoning: Measures of Medical Injury Burden, Malpractice Litigation, and
Alternative Compensation Models from Utah and Colorado, 33 IND. L. REV. 1643, 1676,
1682 (2000). See generally the summary provided in 1B Patricia M. Danzon, Liabilityfor
Medical Malpractice, in HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 1339, 1351-54 (Anthony J.
Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 2000).
18. This was one of the key points made by the Institute of Medicine report in 2000.
COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., TO ERR Is

HUMAN:

BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 42-43 (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000); see also
Hyman, supra note 9, 1642-43; Mello & Brennan, supra note 9, at 1598-600.
19. WEILER ET AL., supra note 15, at 71.
20. Studdert et al., supra note 2, at 285-86.
21. DANZON, supra note 17, at 32, 49-50.
22. See id. at 50.
23. Frederick W. Cheney et al., Standard of Care and Anesthesia Liability, 261 JAMA
1599, 1599, 1601 (1989).
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24

doctor's conduct had fallen short of the relevant standard of care.
Farber and White reported similar findings, after a review of medical
hospital records relating to 242 malpractice lawsuits,25 as did Sloan and
others, following a study of obstetrics and emergency malpractice claims
in Florida.2 6 Indeed, only one study-although probably the one most
often cited-did not find a connection between medical negligence and
That study, which was based on a review of
compensation.
approximately fifty-seven hospital records, instead found only a
The
connection between severity of injury and compensation.'
connection between negligence and compensation can be shown not only
in insurance company practice (paying only claims deemed meritorious,
on the opinion of expert physician reviews) 28 but also with the ultimate
arbiter in this area-the lay jury. 9 It appears that lay juries do "get it
right" most of the time -their lack of medical training notwithstanding.
Most medical malpractice lawsuits never reach trial, although the trial
rate for medical malpractice cases is consistently higher than the trial rate
for other civil lawsuits. 0 The most common disposition is settlement.
Approximately half of all medical malpractice lawsuits are settled prior
to verdict.31 Unilateral abandonment of the case by the plaintiff -ie., a
voluntary dismissal, not involving the payment of money-is also quite
common.
When a medical malpractice case does go to trial, the

24. Mark I. Taragin et al., The Influence of Standardof Care and Severity of Injury on
the Resolution of Medical Malpractice Claims, 117 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 780, 781
(1992).
25. Henry Farber & Michelle White, A Comparison of Formal and Informal Dispute
Resolution in Medical Malpractice, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 777, 786-87, 795 (1994).
26. FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 6, 8. 166-68
(1993); Frank A. Sloan & Chee Ruey Hsieh, Variability in Medical Malpractice Payments:
Is the Compensation Fair?, 24 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 997, 1003, 1010, 1014, 1025-26 (1990);
see Frank A. Sloan & Chee Ruey Hsieh, Injury, Liability, and the Decision To File a
Medical Malpractice Claim, 29 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 413,413,417-20 (1995).
27. Troyen A. Brennan et al., Relation Between Negligent Adverse Events and the
Outcomes of Medical Malpractice Litigation, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1963. 1964-65 (1996).
The authors subsequently acknowledged the singularity of their findings. See Studdert et
al., supra note 17, at 1654.
28. Ralph Peeples et al., The Process of Managing Medical Malpractice Cases: The
Role of Standardof Care, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 877, 884-86 (2002).
29. Taragin et al., supra note 24, at 780-84; Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the
American Civil Jury:An Empirical Perspective, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 849, 859 (1998).
30. Vidmar, supra note 29, at 851; Samuel Gross & Kent Syverud, Getting to No: A
Study of Settlement Negotiationsand the Selection of Casesfor Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319,
364 (1991); see Thomas B. Metzloff, Resolving Malpractice Disputes: Imaging the Jury's
Shadow, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 43, 50 (1991).
31. DANZON, supra note 17, at 32, 42; SLOAN ET AL., supra note 26, at 164, 166;
Peeples et al., supra note 28, at 881 & n.12.
32. DANZON, supra note 17, at 32; SLOAN ET AL., supra note 26, at 164, 167.

2005]

Learning To Crawl

defendant physician prevails most of the time-this finding recurs in the
literature.33 While a number of explanations for this pattern at trial are
possible (e.g., general jury bias in favor of physicians, better expert
witnesses, or greater defense resources), the most likely reason is more
basic. Insurers settle cases they believe1 4 they will lose. They try only
The insurer's assessment is
those cases they believe they can win.
usually borne out at trial. Thus, in a real sense, a plaintiff who takes her
medical malpractice case all the way to trial has already lost: if she has
been unsuccessful in coaxing a settlement from the insurer, the chances
are excellent that she will be unsuccessful with the jury as well. Her
attorney has also lost, most likely. Medical malpractice cases are always

taken on a contingency basis. The percentages may vary (between 20%
and 50%, with 33 1/3% being the most common)35 but the basic truth
does not change: the plaintiff's lawyer is paid only if money is recovered
from the defendant's insurer.

Medical malpractice is in effect a specialty practice, although more so
on the defense side than on the plaintiff side. Defense lawyers are
retained and paid by the malpractice insurer.36 The insurer typically uses
a relatively small number of lawyers to represent its insureds.37 As a
result, defense lawyers are usually highly experienced "repeat players.,

38

33. Studdert et al., supra note 2, at 285. The reported rates vary according to the
sample studied, but the results uniformly indicate a success rate in excess of 50% for
defendant physicians, and usually significantly higher than that. For example, Jury
Verdict Research reported that defendant physicians prevailed 58% of the time in 2002.
News Release, Jury Verdict Research, Medical-Malpractice Jury-Award Median Up
Slightly: Overall Median Compensatory Award Down 30% (Apr. 1, 2004),
stu
http://www.juryverdictresearch.com/PressRoomfPress-releases/Verdict-study/verdict
dy8.html. Weiler has estimated a defense win rate of 67%. Paul Weiler. The Case for NoFault Medical Liability, 52 MD.L. REV. 908, 914 (1993). Sloan and Hsieh reported a rate
of about 75% (Florida). Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 26, at 1007. A recent study of
California verdicts by the RAND Institute for Civil Justice reported a defense win rate of
about 78%, as compared to a 47% defense win rate for all other trials during the same
period. NICHOLAS PACE ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CAPPING NONECONOMIC AWARDS IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE TRIALS 19 (2004), available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND-MG234.pdf. Metzloff reported a rate
of 81% (North Carolina). Metzloff, supra note 30, at 50. For the years 1985-1998, the
Physician Insurers Association of America (PIAA) reported a defense "win" rate at trial
of 81%.
PHYSICIAN INSURERS ASS'N OF AM., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM
EXPENSES 2 (executive summary) (1999); see also Gross & Syverud, supra note 30, at 36263.
34. Peeples et al., supra note 28, at 891.
35. SLOAN ET AL., supra note 26, at 77; Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The
Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice,47 DEPAUL L. REV. 267, 285-86 (1998).
36. Gunnar, supra note 4, at 479-80; Peeples et al., supra note 28, at 880.
37. Peeples et al., supra note 28, at 880.
38. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95, 114 (1974); see also Samuel Gross & Kent
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Defense lawyers are usually paid on an hourly basis, although various
incentive agreements are occasionally used.3 9 In exchange for the
assurance of a certain volume of work, defense lawyers often agree to a
discount from their standard hourly rate.40
Any lawyer admitted to practice can be a malpractice plaintiffs lawyer.
All that is needed is a willing client. Thus, the level of sophistication
among plaintiffs lawyers varies from the inexperienced to the wellseasoned. The costs involved in bringing a medical malpractice lawsuit
are substantial. Medical records must be read and reviewed. The initial
reviewing must be done by someone with a medical background of some
sort-either by in-house staff, or by a paid consultant. Physicians who
treated the plaintiff, other than the defendant(s), often will need to be
identified and interviewed. Expert witnesses must be identified and
retained-and they too will need to review the medical records. Usually
at least several depositions will be necessary: that of the defendant(s),
and at least the key defense experts. Depositions of other witnesses,
such as subsequent treating physicians or members of the defendant's
office staff, are not uncommon. Furthermore, the defense will almost
always depose the plaintiff as well as the plaintiff's experts. Most
observers estimate the cost of preparing a medical malpractice case at a
4
'
Depending on the complexity of the case, the
minimum of $50,000.
pretrial costs can easily run much higher.43 If the case actually goes to

Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 53 (1996); Joel Grossman et al., Do the "Haves" Still Come Out Ahead?, 33 LAW
& Soc'Y REV. 803, 803-05 (1999).
39. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 38, at 15-16.
40. See Galanter, supra note 38, at 114.
41. Expert testimony from other physicians is a fixture of most medical malpractice
litigation. Expert witnesses are used to testify as to the relevant standard of care to which
the defendant physician should be held, and, to a lesser extent, as to causation of the
alleged injury. See generally William Meadow, Operationalizingthe Standard of Medical
Care: Uses and Limitations of Epidemiology To Guide Expert Testimony in Medical
Negligence Allegations, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 675 (2002); Philip G. Peters, Jr., The
Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at the Millennium, 57 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 163 (2001).
42. E.g., Richie Kemp, When Attorneys Come Back for Seconds: Increased Attorney
Fees for ExtraordinaryWork in Medical Malpractice Cases, 25 J. LEGAL MED. 79, 89-90
(2004).
43. Id. ("[Attorneys] risk between $50,000 and $100,000 [to] prepar[e] and litigat[e]
the average medical malpractice action."); Gary T. Schwartz, Empiricism and Tort Law,
2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1067, 1071 ("[T]he cost of mounting a plausible malpractice claim is
at least $50,000."); see also Gail B. Agrawal & Mark A. Hall, What If You Could Sue Your
HMO? Managed Care Liability Beyond the ERISA Shield, 47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 235, 247
(2003); Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, It Was the Best of Times, It Was the Worst of
Times: The PrecariousNature of Plaintiffs' Practicein Texas, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1781, 1798
(2002).
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trial, substantial additional expenses must be added to the total cost. The
high entry cost of medical malpractice lawsuits thus means that in
practice, damages of at least $100,000 must be involved in order to make
bringing the case "worthwhile.""
It is an expensive business, with high risks for the plaintiffs lawyer.
Not only is there the risk of never being paid for the time expended; it is
often the case that the plaintiffs lawyer advances the costs of pretrial
preparation, with little expectation of recovering those funds unless
money is obtained from the defendant either in settlement or at trial.45 It
is not surprising, then, that there are lawyers who specialize in medical
malpractice litigation. Because of the pervasiveness of the contingent
fee, their success is largely a function of the cases they handle. 46 Their
ability to attract good cases, due to their own reputation, as well as their
to 41obtain referrals from other attorneys are of obvious
ability
•
Ultimately, however, the success of a plaintiffs medical
importance.
malpractice lawyer is a function of his or her case-picking ability. 4' A
case of likely liability, but involving only limited recovery (such as a case
where appendicitis was diagnosed later than it should have been, but the
patient suffered little or no permanent harm) may not be worth pursuing.
The amount of time and money needed to prepare the case, compared to
the amount that can be recovered, will make it unlikely that an
experienced plaintiffs lawyer would want to take the case. A case of very
uncertain liability, but involving potentially high damages, might offer
some allure, but unless there is a reasonable chance of a large recovery,
an experienced attorney will likely decline to take that case as well.
After all, 113 of zero is still zero. In fact, specialist plaintiffs attorneys can
49
be compared to portfolio managers. Some cases will yield a recovery,
and some will not; certainty of outcome is never a part of the plaintiffs
lawyer's practice. The key is to pick cases that offer a range of
44.

NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY 61 (1995);

Schwartz, supra note 43, at 1071; Gary T. Schwartz, Medical Malpractice, Tort, Contract,
and Managed Care, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV 885, 895. Almost twenty years ago, a U.S.
General Accounting Office report estimated the damages threshold at $50,000. U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HRD-87-73, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: A FRAMEWORK
FOR ACTION 23 (1987), availableat http://161.203.16.4/d28t5/133122.pdf.

45. Daniels & Martin, supra note 43, at 1812; Kemp, supra note 42, at 89-90; Kritzer,
supra note 35, at 270.
46. Studdert et al., supra note 2, at 284; Daniels & Martin, supra note 43, at 1823.
47. SLOAN ET AL., supra note 26, at 75-76; Daniels & Martin, supra note 43, at 179394.
48. See, e.g., Herbert M. Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths Concerning Contingency Fees,
80 WASH. U. L.Q. 739, 754, 772 (2002).
49. Kritzer, supra note 48, at 754; see also Neil Vidmar & Leigh Anne Brown, Tort
Reform and the Medical Liability Insurance Crisis in Mississippi: Diagnosing the Disease
and Prescribinga Remedy, 22 MIss. C. L. REV. 9, 32 (2002).
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recoveries, both in terms of dollar value and likelihood of success. In
short, the plaintiffs lawyers who succeed are the ones who are adept at
picking good cases. However, there is also a catch: because of the
possible effect of a plaintiffs lawyer's reputation, a case in the hands of a
well-known and respected attorney may be worth much more than the
same case in the hands of a novice attorney.
The claims resolution process, especially when a lawsuit is filed, is
usually slow and expensive for all involved. 0 A very high percentage-in
excess of 55% -of premium dollars are used to pay the "overhead" of
attorney fees, expert reviews, and trial-preparation expenses, to say
nothing of the amount of money spent by the insurer internally.5' As a
means of compensating injured patients, the claims resolution process is
grievously inefficient for all concerned."
For all that we do know about medical malpractice, some questions
remain unanswered. Only limited reliable data is available, for example,
on the typical allocation (if there is such a thing) in a jury award between
economic and noneconomic damages. 3 In many states, jurors are simply
not instructed to make such a determination: damages are just damages. 4
In states where jurors are instructed to make an allocation between
economic and noneconomic damages (for purposes of complying with a
statutory cap on damages, or otherwise) data has not been rigorously
collected and analyzed until quite recently. For the most part, those
efforts have been limited to a single state-California.5 It follows, then,
that even less information is available about economic and noneconomic
damages when cases are settled. Compounding the problem is 56the fact
that confidentiality is a condition of many negotiated settlements.
50. Daniels & Martin, supra note 43, at 1798; Sage, supra note 2, at 29; Weiler, supra
note 33, at 916.
51. Studdert et al., supra note 2, at 285-86; Stephen D. Sugarman, Doctor No, 58 U.
CHI, L. REV. 1499, 1502-03 (1991). The high level of overhead is not unique to medical
malpractice claims. A study conducted by Tillinghast-Towers Perrin in 2003 concluded
that less than 50% of premium dollars goes to compensate injured people. TILLINGHASTTOWERS PERRIN, U.S. TORT COSTS: 2003 UPDATE 17 (2003), available at
http://www.towersperrin.com/tiIlinghast/publications/reports/2003-Tort-Costs-UpdateTo
rtCostsTrends_2003Update.pdf.
52. Hyman, supra note 9, at 1644; Weiler, supra note 33, at 926.
53. Extrapolating from the data derived from the Harvard Medical Practice Study
(and as reported by WEILER, supra note 9), Sugarman estimated that only between 10%
and 15% of malpractice premium dollars actually goes to compensate for out-of-pocket
economic losses. Sugarman, supra note 51, at 1503.
54. See PACE ETAL., supra note 33, at xvii-xviii.
55. See, e.g., id.
56. Nonetheless, confidentiality cannot always be assured. For example, New Jersey
now requires the on-line public posting of payments made by insurers on behalf of
physicians in medical malpractice cases. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-22.23 (West 2004);
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We also do not know much about experts. Is it true that two are better
than one, and that four are better than two? Is it important to have more
experts than the other side? Are in-state experts better than out-of-state
Many lawyers assume they know the answers to these
experts?
questions-but few assumptions about the use of experts have ever been
57
There is
tested empirically. Credible studies are not easy to find.
specialty
same
reason to believe, however, that experts drawn from the
same
the
reviewing
will frequently disagree with one another, even when
medical records.
III.

THE PROBLEM

Knowing all this about the claims resolution process, why is it that
One answer,
crises seem to occur with such annoying frequency?
problem on
the
to
blame
is
industry,
insurance
advanced by critics of the
59
of
investment
the
from
income
When
companies.
the insurance
premium revenues is robust, insurers price their policies aggressively, in
an effort to expand market share; when income from investment of
premium revenue declines (and losses from claims begin to increase) the
industry increases the rates it charges, and blames the increase on the
spiraling level of indemnity payments made to claimants and their
attorneys. 60 Another answer is to argue that, in fact, the amount of
money paid out in claims and in the defense of those claims has been
61
rising dramatically; and so, rate increases are inevitable. It is a debate
that generates more heat than light. Simple answers are not to be
expected. It seems unlikely that a single cause for the problem exists.
Instead, a combination of factors, including a steady increase in claims
severity 6' and a drop in insurance industry investment income over the

Mary P. Gallagher, Internet Posting of Med-Mal Payouts Is Seen To Be Chilling
Settlements, N.J. L.J., Nov. 15, 2004, at 1, 8.
57. See, however, VIDMAR, supra note 44, at 72-76, for a useful discussion of the role
expert witnesses play in medical malpractice litigation. See also Neil Vidmar & Shari
Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1121, 1121-27 (2001).
58. Karen L. Posner et al., Variation in Expert Opinion in Medical Malpractice
Review, 85 ANESTHESIOLOGY 1049, 1049-54 (1996).
59.

See,

e.g., ROBERT HUNTER & JOANNE DOROSHOW,

CTR. FOR JUSTICE &

DEMOCRACY, PREMIUM DECEIT 2 (1999), available at http://www.centerjd.org/air/
PremiumDeceit.pdf; Zimmerman & Oster, supra note 5.
60.

See AMS. FOR INS. REFORM, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: STABLE

LOSSES/UNSTABLE RATES 2004, at 1, 2, 3-4, available at http://www.insurance-reform.org/
StableLosses04.pdf.
61. See, e.g., AM. MED. ASS'N, supra note 2, at 3-5.
62. "Claims severity" refers to the amount of compensation demanded and/or
recovered by a claimant.
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past several years seems to be at fault.63 What seems true, regardless of
the cause of the crisis, is that few people are well served by the existing
system: certainly not patients or physicians, and perhaps not plaintiffs
lawyers, defense lawyers, or insurers. Most victims of medical negligence
never seek redress-either by filing a claim, or by filing a lawsuit. 64 Thus,
most injuries go uncompensated. Physicians are caught in the middle.
Either they are being manipulated by their insurers, or they are being
manipulated by dissatisfied patients and plaintiffs attorneys. Plaintiffs
lawyers typically find themselves vilified as rapacious opportunists, while
defense counsel are seen as a necessary (but still regrettable) evil.
The point here is not that medical malpractice law as it is practiced
today fails because the premiums doctors have to pay are too high, or
because doctors do not trust the tort liability system. Those two
observations are symptoms of a larger failing. Judged by either of the
two fundamental goals of modern tort law-deterrence and
compensation 65-the medical malpractice system is a failure, for most of
the people, most of the time.
There are many reasons to believe that as a system of deterrence,
medical malpractice law does not work. For deterrence to work, a
wrongful behavior must be identified, and a punishment must be
imposed. In order to alter his or her behavior, the wrongdoer must know
what it was he or she did wrong-and must know what the consequences
will be of behaving wrongfully in the future. While doctors who are sued
for malpractice usually know what it is they are alleged to have done
wrong, it is not often the case that they agree with the ultimate
determination of liability, if such an adverse determination is made." It
does not matter if the adverse determination is made by a jury at trial or
by the physician's own insurer who chooses to settle the case. At bottom
is the conviction that no layman has the training or insight to judge a
physician's medical decisions or behavior. 67 Even if the jury actually gets
it "right," that fundamental conviction remains. There is some irony to
this: one of the key ways that an insurer will make a determination about
liability is to send the relevant complaint and medical records to other
physicians practicing in the same specialty for review. Only when the
consensus of the outside reviewers indicates a serious problem will an

63.

U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 4, at 43-45; Thorpe, supra note 2, at

64.
65.
ET AL.,
66.
67.

See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORIS §§ 10-11, at 17-19 (2000); W. PAGE KEETON
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 20-26 (5th ed. 1984).
Peeples et al., supra note 15, at 341-42.
Vidmar, supra note 29, at 858; see also supra notes 15-16.

21.
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insurer seek a settlement. 68 Thus, peer review does routinely happenexcept that it's usually anonymous and almost never involves direct
communication between reviewer and reviewed.
Beyond these
behavioral observations, there is the fact that when compensation is paid,
it is paid by the insurer. Rarely is any portion of an award or settlement
actually paid by the physician.6 It should come as no surprise, then, that
efforts to identify a meaningful deterrence effect produced by the
malpractice liability system have been unsuccessful.7"
Judged against the goal of compensation-where only meritorious
claims would be paid, and where the amounts paid would bear a
consistent, logical connection to the type of injury sustained-the
medical malpractice system fails badly. There are problems of erroneous
compensation (paying the wrong claimants), of erroneous
noncompensation (not paying patients injured by medical negligence), of
overpayment, and of underpayment.
A. Erroneous Compensation

Not all claimants who receive compensation deserve it. This concern
can be heard anywhere personal injury claims are defended; it is not
unique to medical malpractice. There is substantial empirical evidence
that indicates erroneous compensation is not uncommon in medical
malpractice cases.7

Nonetheless, the incidence of successful "false"

claiming does not seem excessive. Strictly "nuisance" payments do not
seem to happen very often. Most professional liability insurers insist on a
showing of at least potential liability before payment will be discussed.72
B. Erroneous Non-compensation

Several major studies within the past twenty years indicate that the
incidence of medical negligence far exceeds the rate at which injured

68.

See Peeples et al.,supra note 28, at 886.

69.

Although deductibles are not commonly used in medical malpractice insurance, it

is possible that one or more adverse events might induce an insurer to either refuse to
renew coverage, or require a higher premium in the future. This rarely happens in
practice, however.
70. Hyman, supra note 9, at 1644-45; Mello & Brennan, supra note 9, at 1607-09.
71. See, e.g., Brennan et al., supra note 27, at 1965-66 (stating that compensation is
predicted by severity of injury, not medical negligence); Cheney et al., supra note 23, at
1601 (stating that in 42% of cases studied, payment was made even though care provided
was deemed within the standard of care); Taragin et al., supra note 24, at 781 (stating that
compensation paid in 21% of cases was deemed defensible by the insurer).
72. Peeples et al., supra note 28, at 886. For example, as reported by the PIAA, in
2002 almost 70% of all claims filed against physicians were closed without any payment.
See AM. MED. AWS'N, supra note 2, at 2-3.

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 54:703

patients claim compensation for such injuries. Most victims of medical
negligence never assert a claim, much less file a lawsuit. One obvious
reason for this is the high entry costs of medical malpractice litigation.74
Beyond these concerns of simply paying the right cases, there is also
the problem of the close case. Not all cases are clear cut on the issue of
negligence. Experts often disagree as to what the standard of care
requires. 7 - Given the fact that experts are hired either by the plaintiff or
the defendant, this should not be surprising.
An additional problem is the simple fact that the claims resolution
process is an adversarial system. Factors other than medical negligence
can influence the outcome-such as the disparate skill levels of the
attorneys, the polish of one party's experts, the relative attractiveness of
the plaintiff and the defendant, as well as the makeup of the jury.76
C. Under- and Overpayment

Compensation is not a simple "yes or no" proposition. A $5000
payment in settlement of a claim for a permanent, debilitating injury is
unlikely to represent adequate compensation, just as a payment of
$500,000 for a simple delay in the diagnosis of appendicitis is likely to
represent over-compensation. Although "lottery" type awards are not
unheard of (and are invariably widely publicized), most research suggests
that, at least in medical malpractice, claimants are typically
undercompensated.77

The problems of erroneous compensation, non-compensation, and
over- and
underpayment
can
persnalinjuy
•
78 also be seen easily enough in other areas of
personal injury litigation. Claiming rates may vary by type of injury
(e.g., automobile versus hospital), but the problems of erroneous
compensation and erroneous non-compensation are not unique to
medical malpractice litigation. The puzzle of damages-how they should
be calculated, what factors should be included, and who should do the
calculating-is a problem common throughout tort law.79 Ultimately, a
73. See, e.g., Mello & Brennan, supra note 9, at 1599; Studdert et al., supra note 17, at
1682.
74. See authorities cited supra notes 17-18; see also supra text accompanying notes 4344.
75. See Peeples et al., supra note 28, at 884; Posner et al., supra note 58, at 1051.
76. This phenomenon-that factors other than the existence of medical fault can
influence outcomes-has been occasionally noted in the literature, but seldom studied.
See, e.g., SLOAN ET AL., supra note 26, at 183-84; Brennan et al., supra note 27, at 1965-66.
77. SLOAN ET AL., supra note 26, at 206-07; Sage, supra note 2, at 29; Weiler, supra
note 33, at 918.
78. See, for example, the discussion in SLOAN ET AL., supra note 26, at 187-88.
79. See, e.g., Studdert et al., Are Damage Caps Regressive? A Study of Malpractice
Jury Verdicts in California,23 HEALTrH AFF. 54, 55 (2004).
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claimant's damages are whatever amount, if any, the jury awards, or that
he or she is willing to accept in settlement. It is a land populated by rules
of thumb and multipliers but few if any guidelines. Even one of the more
well-known "rules of thumb"-that total damages should equal some
multiple (often either two or three) of "special" (i.e., economic)
damages-does not seem to be borne out in practice. Indeed, plaintiffs
81
lawyers themselves often disagree on what a case is worth. In an offthe-rack world, damage awards defy uniformity. Medical malpractice
awards are no exception. s8
Medical malpractice litigation points out another failure of the goal of
compensation, however. Medical malpractice claims, once they become
3
lawsuits, are almost always expensive for both sides." Expressed in
premium dollar terms, most researchers estimate that 40% of every
premium dollar is spent on litigation-related expenses, primarily legal
fees.8 Of this percentage, about half can be attributed to plaintiffs
In addition to the
lawyers and about half to defense counsel."
predictable legal fees and the usual discovery costs that will be incurred,
80. Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingent-Fee Lawyers and Their Clients: Settlement
Expectations, Settlement Realities, and Issues of Control in the Lawyer-Client Relationship,
23 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 795, 817-18 (1998).
81. See id. at 817. Two of the more famous studies are by DOUGLAS ROSENTHAL,
LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE (1974), and GERALD WILLIAMS, LEGAL
NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT (1983).
82. A number of researchers, reviewing jury verdicts, have noted serious "horizontal
equity" problems: compensation for the same or similar injury can vary greatly, from
claimant to claimant. See, e.g., Sloan & Hsieh, supranote 26, at 1026; Studdert et al., supra
note 79, at 56; see also Kirk B. Johnson et al., A Fault-BasedAdministrativeAlternative for
Resolving Medical Malpractice Claims, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1365, 1369 (1989).
83. A 2003 report prepared by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) estimated the average cost of defending claims that settled in 2001 was $39,819
(using data provided by the PIAA). OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC'Y FOR PLANNING &
EVALUATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADDRESSING THE NEW
HEALTH CRISIS: REFORMING THE MEDICAL LITIGATION SYSTEM TO IMPROVE THE
QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE 12 (2003), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/
reports/medliab.pdf. A previous report prepared by HHS estimated the average cost of
defense, for all claims, settled or not, increased by $24,000 between 1987 and 1999.
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC'Y FOR PLANNING & EVALUATION, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CONFRONTING THE NEW HEALTH CARE CRISIS:
IMPROVING HEALTH CARE QUALITY AND LOWERING COSTS BY FIXING OUR MEDICAL
LIABILITY SYSTEM 10 (2002), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/litrefm.pdf.
The largest insurer of physicians in North Carolina, Medical Mutual Insurance Company
of North Carolina, has reported an average defense cost per claim of $22,544, for 1848
claims filed during 1976-2003. David Sousa, NC Medical Malpractice Insurance Data v.
Plaintiffs' Attorneys: Can Fact Prevailover Fiction?, 64 N.C. MED. J. 182, 185 (2003).
84. Studdert et al., supra note 2, at 286.
85. Danzon, supra note 17, at 1369; see WEILER, supra note 9, at 53 & n.28. A study
conducted by Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, examining tort costs in general, estimated defense
costs at 14% of the total amount. TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 51, at 17.
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both plaintiff and defendant will have to spend money on experts. It is
rare that a claim or a defense can be made without the use of expert
testimony as to standard of care and causation. State law rarely imposes
any limitations on the number of experts that may be identified for
possible use at trial8. As a result, "more is better" often dominates each
side's case preparation. In this particular arms race, however, the
defense has the advantage. It remains true that recruiting defense
experts, particularly those who practice within the state, is much easier
than recruiting plaintiffs experts8 7 Regardless of who retains them, the
services of experts do not come cheap. Hourly rates of several hundred
dollars for reviewing medical records or testifying at deposition are
common."8 Even higher rates for trial testimony are also quite common.
In short, the malpractice liability system does a poor job of
compensating injured patients, and it requires a high level of overhead to
operate. There is little reason to think that the goal of deterrence is any
better served. It is a woefully inefficient system badly in need of repair.
IV. WHAT HAS BEEN TRIED

Certainly many kinds of fixes have been tried. Even more have been
proposed, and not tried. The more frequently tried reforms have
included the imposition of statutory limits on the amount of damages
that may be awarded to a successful plaintiff (caps); the use of pre-suit or
pretrial screening panels (mandatory and voluntary); abolition or
modification of the "collateral source rule"; 9° a requirement that prior to
86. Virginia is a notable exception. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8-01.581.20(C) (Michie
2000) (stating that each party is limited to using no more than two experts per medical
discipline on any issue presented).
87. In addition, there is the perceived threat of professional sanctions being invoked

against physicians who testify in favor of plaintiffs. To date, the threat is more perceived
than real. However, there are recent instances of professional discipline being imposed on
physicians who testify for plaintiffs (on the grounds that their testimony is at odds with the
prevailing standard of care). See, e.g., Austin v. Am. Ass'n of Neurological Surgeons, 253
F.3d 967, 968 (7th Cir. 2001) (Posner, J.); Fred L. Cohen, The Expert Medical Witness in

Legal Perspective,25 J. LEGAL MED. 185, 186 (2004); Theresa DiPaola et al., Silence of the
Experts, TRIAL, Oct. 2004, at 20,20 (2004).

88.

See, e.g., James A. Mellowitz, Whatever the Market Will Bear: FightingExorbitant

Expert Fees with Rule 26(B) (4)(c) (i), RES GESTAE, Feb. 1995, at 15, 16-17.

89. Ten years ago, Vidmar estimated typical expert witness fees as ranging between
$300 and $500 per hour. VIDMAR, supra note 44, at 60, 74. Vidmar's estimates were

based on his observations of North Carolina cases.

Id. at 60. Following extensive

conversations with both plaintiffs and defense lawyers in North Carolina in 2004, I believe
the "going rate" for expert review and testimony has at least doubled since that time.
90. See, e.g., NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE MEDICAL
LIABILITY
LAWS
TABLE
1, available
at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/insur/
medliability.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2005). The collateral source rule excludes from the
jury's consideration the existence of other sources of insurance or other compensation
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filing suit, the plaintiff's attorney certify in some way that he or she has
consulted with a medical expert who will support the allegations of the
complaint; and various types of alternative dispute resolution, primarily
arbitration and mediation. 9' Heightened regulation of malpractice (and
other) insurers has also been occasionally tried.
There are, of course, other proposals that have never been tried, at
least not on a serious scale. The most prominent of these include various
no-fault proposals, 92 in which the emphasis would be on compensation in
the presence of an undesirable outcome due to medical intervention,
rather than in the presence of medical negligence. Various changes
directed at the judicial system itself have also been proposed, including
the creation of a specialty court which would hear and determine only
cases alleging medical malpractice; 93 or a resort to special juries, in which
the jury pool would be limited to those with medical degrees;" or an
administrative, fault-based system that would replace the trial court.9
Like no-fault, these ideas have attracted few adherents outside the
academy.
Of the various reforms that have actually been tried, the two most
sweeping in their potential effect are the imposition of damage caps and
the use of screening panels. The history of both these reforms has been
checkered. In a number of states, these reforms have been declared
unconstitutional by the courts.96 Furthermore, assessing the success of
these reforms has proved difficult for at least two distinct reasons. First,
no two states have done it exactly the same way. In states that have
imposed caps, there is considerable variation as to the amount of the cap,
(such as medical insurance, or workers' compensation) available to the injured party. See,
e.g., Salitros v. Chrysler Corp., 306 F.3d 562, 573 (8th Cir. 2002).
91. See, e.g., NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 90, at 3.
92. See, e.g., Mello & Brennan, supra note 9, at 1626-27; David Studdert & Troyen
Brennan, No-Fault Compensationfor Medical Injuries: The Prospectfor ErrorPrevention,
286 JAMA 217, 219-20 (2001); Randall R. Bovbjerg & Frank A. Sloan, No-Fault for
Medical Injury: Theory and Evidence, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 53, 55-56 (1998); Jeffrey
O'Connell, Offers That Can't Be Refused: Foreclosure of Personal Injury Claims by
Defendants' Prompt Tender of Claimants' Net Economic Losses, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 589,

615-16 (1982); Weiler, supra note 33, at 919-20.
93. See STRUVE, supra note 15, at 68-70; Lindsay Fortado, States Weigh 'Med-Mal'
Courts, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 13, 2004, at 5, 5; Philip K. Howard, The Best Course of Treatment,
N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2003, at A15.
94. Alan Feigenbaum, Note, Special Juries: Deterring Spurious Medical Malpractice
Litigation in State Courts, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1361, 1415-17 (2003).
95. Johnson et al., supra note 82, at 1367.
96. Courts in Alabama, Illinois, Kansas, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington have at various times found damage caps
unconstitutional. AM. MED. ASS'N, supra note 2, at 36-37; Gunnar, supra note 4, at 486.
Courts in Florida, Illinois, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming have at various times
found screening panels unconstitutional. See STRUVE, supra note 15, at 56-57.
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and as to what sort of damages are subject to the cap.97 Similar problems
await when one attempts to measure the success (or lack thereof) of
screening panels. Some are mandatory; some are not. Some are
physician dominated; some are not. Panel findings are admissible at trial
in some states, but inadmissible in others. 9'
The second reason why assessing what works and what doesn't work is
the problem of compounding factors. If a state adopts more than one
reform, and insurance rates stabilize, to which reform should the credit
(if any) be given? If rates do not stabilize, to which reform should the
blame be directed? Further, factors outside the control of the legislature
have an influence on rates: the level of insurance losses sustained in the
past year, the prime rate, and market performance are just a few
possibilities."
A. Caps on Damages
Caps come in many different styles and flavors 9 ° Approximately half

the states impose caps of some sort in medical malpractice cases.' °' Most
of those states simply place a dollar limit on the amount of noneconomic

damages (i.e., pain and suffering, emotional distress, mental anguish)
that may be recovered.

2

Several states, however, limit the overall

amount that may be recovered.'

In some states, caps on damages are

accompanied by limits on the plaintiff's attorney fees."

97. See, e.g., NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 90.
98. See Jean Macchiaroli, Medical Malpractice Screening Panels: Proposed Model
Legislation To Cure JudicialIlls, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 181,193 (1990).
99. Thorpe, supra note 2, at 21; Stephen Zuckerman et al., Effect of Tort Reforms and
Other Factors on Medical Malpractice Insurance Premiums, 27 INQUIRY 167, 168 (1990);
see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-836, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE:
IMPLICATIONS OF RISING PREMIUMS ON ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE

37(2003).

100. Limits on punitive damages can be thought of as a type of cap, as well. Many
states restrict the amount of punitive damages that may be awarded, in one fashion or
another. See PACE ET AL., supra note 33, at 60. Punitive damages, however, are rarely an
issue in medical malpractice cases. See id. at 59-60 (noting that punitive damages were
awarded in less than 1% of the medical malpractice trials in California ending in a
plaintiff's verdict).
101. See Studdert et al., supra note 79, at 54; see also AM. MED. ASS'N, supra note 2, at
24.
102. See AM. MED. ASS'N, supra note 2, at 24.
103. Id. at 25. States with caps on total damages (economic and noneconomic) include
Colorado, Indiana, Louisiana, Nebraska, New Mexico, and Virginia. See id.
104. California's statute, the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA),
CAL. Bus. & PROF. § 6146 (West 2003), enacted in 1975, is the most prominent example.
Plaintiff's attorney fees in medical malpractice cases are limited to 40% of the first $50,000
recovered; 33 1/3% of the next $50,000 awarded; 25% of the next $500,000 awarded; and
15% of any amount awarded over $600,000. Id. § 6146(a). In 2004 Florida voters
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In their present incarnation, there are several significant problems with
the use of caps. First, there is the fact that not all injuries are alike, and
not all plaintiffs are alike. Caps have the effect of imposing a limit on the
amount of damages a plaintiff may recover-regardless of how
grievously he or she has been injured. This remains true even when
attention is limited to noneconomic caps. The fact that the cap, if set
high enough, may only occasionally come into play merely lessens the
problem: a limit has been imposed, and in at least some cases, that limit
will mean that an injured party is less than fully compensated. There is,
in other words, an inherent arbitrariness to caps.'O' The impact of caps
does not seem to be limited to a small number of plaintiffs. A recent
study of California medical malpractice verdicts found that the $250,000
cap on noneconomic damages was imposed to reduce the plaintiff's
recovery 51% of the time. '°6 A similar study by the RAND Corporation
Justice reported that the $250,000 cap was imposed
Institute for Civil
17
45% of the time. 1
As the severity of the claimant's injury increases, the chances increase
that the cap will limit his or her recovery. On this point the available
empirical evidence is consistent. Noneconomic caps work to the special
detriment of severely injured claimants who can show relatively little in
the way of economic losses. Typical examples would include cases
involving deafness, disfigurement, or chronic pain.0 8 Many wrongful
death cases, and cases involving infants less than one-year-old, also seem
to be disproportionately affected by such caps.9 Unless we are willing to
say that no injury, no matter how grievous, is worth, say, more than
$250,000 for pain and suffering, a cap has the effect of penalizing those
who are most seriously injured by another's negligence.
Imposition of a cap also has the effect of exacerbating a disparity
widely known in personal injury litigation: some lives are worth more
approved a constitutional amendment restricting attorney fees in medical malpractice
cases as well. See FL. CONST. art. I, § 26 (West, WESTLAW through Nov. 2, 2004).
105. See MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN, THE PROJECT ON MED. LIAB. ON PA., RESOLVING
THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CRISIS: FAIRNESS CONSIDERATIONS 69-70 (2003),
available
at
http://medliabilitypa.org/research/mehlman0603/MehlmanReport.pdf;
Studdert et al., supra note 79, at 63.
106. Studdert et al., supra note 79, at 57. Studdert's team collected jury verdict data
for the period between 1985 and 2002. Id.
107. PACE ET AL., supra note 33, at 21. The RAND study reviewed California verdicts
from 1995 to 1999. Id. at xviii. Both the Studdert and others study and the RAND study
relied on data supplied by California Jury Verdicts Weekly. Id. at xix; Studdert et al.,
supra note 79, at 64, Because it is likely that smaller verdicts were underreported, the
actual percentage of "capped cases" may be somewhat less than 45%. See the discussion
of this issue in PACE ET AL., supra note 33, at 63-64.
108. Studdert et al., supra note 79, at 62.
109. PACE ET AL., supra note 33, at 23-30.
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than others. The same injury, sustained by two different people, can lead
to very different recoveries. If noneconomic damages are limited, then
economic damages matter more.
Thus, a thirty-year-old highly
compensated stockbroker, now permanently disabled, will have
economic damages (calculated on the basis of lost future earnings) far in
excess of the economic damages sustained by a thirty-year-old stay-athome parent. In the absence of caps, noneconomic damages can
nonetheless be awarded to acknowledge that the pain and suffering of
both the stockbroker and the stay-at-home parent are substantial. The
stockbroker, due to his or her documented lost earnings, may still
recover more than the stay-at-home parent; but the stay-at-home
parent's recovery, already limited by the absence of significant economic
damages, will not be limited a second time-unless caps are imposed. By
exacerbating this sort of disparity, the use of caps has the secondary
effect of further limiting access to the courts. Given the same sort of
injury to two different people, one profitably employed and the other a
stay-at-home parent, the odds are good that the latter will have a much
more difficult time than the former finding a lawyer to represent her. In
most parts of the country, a case capped at $250,000 (if liability is
established), with little in the way of economic damages, will not be a
very attractive case for experienced attorneys to take. " °
The second problem with caps is less theoretical. Legislation imposing
caps has met with an uneven fate around the country. Efforts to
implement caps on a national basis have, to date, been unsuccessful. 1"
At the state level, some courts have upheld the use of caps, and others
have not. "'
In the states where caps have been found to be
unconstitutional, there is of course an additional option. The cap can be

110. Id. at xxviii; Studdert et al., supra note 79, at 63. It also appears that the
imposition of noneconomic caps has a greater impact on women, than on men. The
RAND researchers found that the median reduction in total award for women, due to the
MICRA cap, was 34%; in contrast, the median reduction for men was 25%. See PACE FT
AL., supra note 33, at 32. This may be because a higher percentage of the total award for
women is attributable to noneconomic damages. See id. at 32-33.
111. See AMS. FOR INS. REFORM, supranote 60.
112. See Tanya Albert, Challenges in State Courts: New Tort Reforms Under Fire,
AMEDNEWS.COM,
Nov.
1,
2004,
http:/www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2004/11/01/
prllll0.htm. Courts in eight states have struck down mandatory caps, while courts in
fifteen states have upheld them.
Id; see also NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, supra note 90; Albert Yoon, Damage Caps and Civil Litigation: An
Empirical Study of Medical Malpractice Litigation in the South, 3 AMER. LAW & ECON.
REV. 199, 201 (2001); Elizabeth Poisson, Comment, Addressing the Impropriety of
Statutory Caps on Pain and Suffering Awards in the Medical MalpracticeSystem, 82 N.C. L.
REV. 759, 772-74 (2004).
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113

made a part of the state constitution. In the end, whether or not caps
are constitutional seems beside the point. The amount of time it takes to
resolve the question makes the value of the exercise doubtful, if what is
needed is prompt change.
A third problem has to do with the law of unintended consequences.
To what extent does the imposition of a cap on some types of injuries,
and on some types of damages, distort personal injury litigation in
general? If medical malpractice recoveries are capped, then an incentive
arises to recast lawsuits originally styled as malpractice as something
else-medical products liability claims, perhaps, or claims based on lack
are not
of informed consent-or to find new defendants to sue11who
4
protected under the terms of the cap legislation in question.
Fourth, it is not at all clear that mandatory caps have worked. While
there is solid evidence that caps do seem to reduce or at least restrain
claim severity by limiting total jury awards,' 5 it is less clear that caps have
a meaningful or lasting effect on malpractice insurance premiums. Thus,
Zuckerman and others reported, in a 1990 study, that "hard" caps (i.e.,
dollar limitations on all damages, both economic and noneconomic)
reduced premiums." 6 In a more recent study, Thorpe found that
premiums in states with caps on damages were, on average, 17.1% lower
than in states without caps on damages. ' 7 Nonetheless, the evidence is
less than compelling."8 Many factors affect malpractice insurance
premiums. Some of those factors have little relation to tort reforms in

113. For example, in 2003 Texas voters approved proposition 12, amending the Texas
Constitution. See TEX. CONST. art. 111, § 66; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §
74.301-.303 (Vernon 2004) (imposing a cap on noneconomic damages of $250,000 per
health care provider).
114. See, e.g., Sage, supra note 2, at 16-17.
115. PACE ET AL., supra note 33, at 20-23; Studdert et al., supra note 2, at 288. See
generally Studdert et al., supra note 79; Yoon, supra note 112.
116. Zuckerman et al., supra note 99, at 175.
117. Thorpe, supra note 2, at 26.
118. For example, in June 2003 Weiss Ratings Inc. issued a report challenging the view
that damage caps had an appreciable effect on medical malpractice insurance premiums.
MARTIN D. WEISS ET AL., WEISS RATINGS INC., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CAPS: THE
IMPACT OF NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGE CAPS ON PHYSICIAN PREMIUMS, CLAIMS

PAYOUT LEVELS AND AVAILABILITY OF COVERAGE (2003), available at
http://www.weissratings.com/MedicalMalpractice.pdf. In an October 2004 news release,
the Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights made a similar claim, citing
documents filed by GE Medical Protective, a large malpractice insurer, with the Texas
Department of Insurance. See News Release, The Foundation for Taxpayer & Consumer
Rights, Nation's Largest Medical Malpractice Insurer Declares Caps on Damages Don't
Work, Raises Docs' Premiums; Smoking Gun Document Exposes Insurance Industry Lies
(Oct. 27, 2004), http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/insurance/pr/pr004698.php3.
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general, or caps on noneconomic damage awards in particular."9 There
is also the fact that the existence of caps does not necessarily insure
against the appearance (or reoccurrence) of a crisis. In 2004 the AMA
identified twenty states as "medical liability crisis states., 12° Eight of the2
crisis states (40%) had noneconomic damage caps in place at the time,' '
although in six of those states, damage caps were less than two years
old. 22 Of the thirty states not listed as being in crisis, nineteen (63%) had
adopted cap legislation of some sort; eleven states (and the District of
Columbia) had not. 2 3 The point seems to be that the imposition of caps
lessens the chances of a "crisis," but does not guarantee against it.
There is one last aspect to the use of caps that, though perhaps
obvious, needs to be acknowledged. Caps are popular with doctors,
insurers, and with many defense lawyers. Caps are unpopular with
plaintiffs and plaintiffs lawyers. Any proposal to implement caps in a
given state is certain to draw both strong support and strong opposition.
In the event that caps are adopted by a given state, it is reasonable to
expect constitutional challenges shortly thereafter-leaving the efficacy
of the "reform" in doubt until the challenges are resolved, one way or the
other. The point is simply this: when caps are proposed, there will be
clear winners and clear losers, depending on the ultimate fate of the cap
proposal.
B. Screening Panels
The story with respect to screening panels is also less than clear. The

principle is certainly appealing. Medical malpractice liability turns on
whether the relevant standard of care was met or not. 24 To determine
119.

See .U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-702, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

INSURANCE:

MULTIPLE FACTORS

HAVE CONTRIBUTED

TO INCREASED PREMIUM

RATES 4-5 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d03702high.pdf; Thorpe,
supra note 2, at 27; Studdert et al., supra note 2, at 288. It should also be noted that the
2004 RAND study of California's medical malpractice reforms did not attempt to measure
the effect, ifany, that damage caps have had on insurance premiums. See PACE ET AL.,
supra note 33, at 4.
120. AM. MED. ASS'N, supra note 2, at 9.
121. The states were Florida, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, Ohio,
Texas, and West Virginia. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.118 (West 2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS

ANN. ch. 231, § 60H (West 2000); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-60 (2004); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
538.210 (West 2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41A.031 (Michie 2003); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2323.43 (Anderson 2004); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE AN. § 74.301 (Vernon
2004); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-8 (Michie 2004).
122. In contrast, Massachusetts and Missouri both adopted caps in 1986. MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 31, § 60H Historical and Statutory Notes (West 2000); MO. ANN. STAT. §
538.210 (West 2004).
123. AM. MED. ASS'N, supra note 2, at 9, 24-25.
124. DOBBS, supra note 65, at 631-34; WEILER, supra note 9, at 19.
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this, the expert testimony of other physicians is almost always required .
Given this need for expert testimony, a pre-suit or pretrial determination
by a neutral panel, consisting of physicians and others, might have the
effect of filtering out cases in which liability is unlikely to be shown. If all
goes well for the defense, a public trial is avoided, and the defendant
doctor is vindicated. Meanwhile, the plaintiff and his or her attorney
have at least been spared the greater expense and delay of a full-blown
trial-or they have at least been warned about the weakness of the case.
If all does not go well for the defense, the plaintiff will know that pursuit
of the claim is worthwhile. The defense will be on notice that a
settlement may be worth pursuing. 126 As originally conceived, screening
panels were intended to make the claims resolution process work more
efficiently, by encouraging the settlement of meritorious cases, and by
identifying nonmeritorious cases at an early stage. 27 The track record of
screening panels has not borne out this sort of promise, however. At one
time, more than thirty states used some sort of screening panel. 2 " Today,
due to judicial challenges and legislative repeals, that number is down to
twenty.129 A principal shortcoming has been increased delay in the claims
resolution process.130
The empirical studies have also been less than kind. Danzon found
that screening panels had virtually no effect on medical malpractice
litigation."' Zuckerman and others likewise found that panels had no
effect on the severity of paid claims, and had little effect on malpractice
insurance premiums. 2 Goldman, examining the performance of peer
assessments by physicians, found a surprisingly low level of consistency
Because physician
with respect to their medical conclusions.
participation is an essential part of all screening panels, this finding casts
doubt on the reliability of the conclusions reached by panelists regarding

125. DOBBS, supra note 65, at 639; see also DANZON, supra note 17, at 16.
126. STRUVE, supra note 15, at 55-56.
127. Macchiaroli, supra note 98, at 186.
128. STRUVE, supra note 15, at 3.
129. Id. at 57.
130. Id. at 62; Douglas Eitel et al., Medicine on Trial: PhysicianAttitudes About Expert
Medical Witnesses, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 345, 351 (1997); Jona Goldschmidt, Where Have All
the Panels Gone? A History of the Arizona Medical Liability Review Panel, 23 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1013. 1107 (1991).
131. DANZON, supra note 17, at 78, 198-202.
132. Zuckerman et al., supra note 99, at 175-76.
133. Ronald L. Goldman, The Reliability of Peer Assessments of Quality of Care, 267
JAMA 958, 959 (1992).
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liability.'34 In sum, it is hard to escape the conclusion that screening
panels offer little in the way of malpractice reform.
V.

A SIMPLE PROPOSAL

Thirty years after the "first" malpractice insurance crisis, promising
solutions remain elusive. It may be that the reforms of the past have
been too ambitious. Perhaps we have tried to do too much, too quickly.
We now find ourselves in a position where, it seems, any reform
significant enough to make a difference will necessarily produce clear
winners and losers. The likely result is political impasse; the inevitable
result is resentment all around. It is precisely this zero-sum aspect of the
debate that makes a resolution difficult. With so much seemingly at
stake, there is little reason not to simply adopt an entrenched position,
and stay there. Any significant proposal will face an uncertain fate.
There is no reason for plaintiffs, and their attorneys, to favor the
imposition of caps. There is, likewise, no reason for physicians, and their
insurers, not to favor them. Maybe imposing caps will work, after all.
Even if caps fail to have the desired effect, there will still be other
benefits. Caps on damages have the effect of limiting the potential size
of the fee a plaintiffs attorney can earn from a given case. This is true
whether the cap is applied to all damages, or only to noneconomic
damages. Thus, even if malpractice rates continue to rise, at least the
plaintiffs malpractice bar will have been chastened. At a minimum, the
economic incentive for bringing a malpractice lawsuit will have been
curtailed. When limits are also imposed on the percentage of the
recovery the plaintiffs lawyer is entitled to (typically referred to as
"sliding scale" fees), the effect is even more pronounced.
Why not change the incentives? Perhaps it is possible to give everyone
a little something. It should be possible to give physicians and their
insurers what they want-caps on noneconomic damages-but in a way
that makes the concession palatable to plaintiffs and their attorneys. At

134. Id. at 959-60; see also Robert A. Caplan et al., Effect of Outcome on Physician
Judgments of Appropriateness of Care, 265 JAMA 1957, 1959 (1991) (finding that the
judgment of medical reviewers, regarding compliance with the standard of care, can be
influenced by the reviewers' knowledge of the severity of the outcome); Posner et al.,
supra note 58, at 1051-52.
135. See, e.g., PACE ET AL., supra note 33, at 35-37 (discussing the effect of California's
rules). Imposing limits on the size of the fee a medical malpractice plaintiffs lawyer may
charge, expressed in terms of a percentage of any award recovered, has become more
popular of late. For example, in November 2004 Florida voters approved an amendment
to the state constitution capping attorney fees in medical malpractice actions at 30% of
any award recovered. See FL. CONST. art. I, § 26 (West, WESTLAW through Nov. 2,
2004).
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one level, this idea is nothing more elaborate than simple horse trading.
It may be, though, that more is at stake.
Within bounds, the malpractice insurance system works well for
many-but not all-of the key players. The insurer collects premiums
from its insured physicians, invests the money, and uses the proceeds to
defend (and occasionally indemnify) its insureds. In return, the insurer
expects to make at least a modest profit. The insured physicians, in
exchange for their premium payments, are assured that in the event of a
lawsuit, a defense will be provided. If an indemnity has to be paid, the
insurer will see to it. Defense lawyers are paid out of the premiums, or
the income generated by the premiums. So too are plaintiffs lawyers and
plaintiff patients, when successful. It is an organic system in miniature,
where the premium payments function as the life-blood. When only one
of the key players is being shortchanged, the system can still function.
When more than one key player is being shortchanged, "crisis" results.
As the size of indemnity payments rises, so does the overall cost of
The premiums needed to fund the system must also
defense.'36
increase-but only to a point. Where that point lies depends on one's
perspective, but it does exist. Beyond that point, more and more
physicians stop buying insurance, or move to another jurisdiction, or stop
practicing medicine. The result is less money generated from premiums
to fund the system.
It is silly to think that increased costs of defense can be addressed
simply by injecting more money into the system. Raising premiums and
"passing the costs along" is no longer possible, if it ever was. 7 Instead,
the distribution of the money that flows through the malpractice claims
resolution system needs to be readjusted. By adjusting the distribution
patterns, the overall level of money expended on the claims resolution
system can be controlled. At the same time, the system as it now exists
could be improved for all concerned. This could be done by setting up a
system of separate "tracks" for medical malpractice cases. The plaintiff
alone would choose the track to use, determined by the amount of
damages he or she plans to seek. The management of the case would
differ, depending on the "track" chosen.
For example, three tracks could be made available: track one, for cases
designated by plaintiff's counsel as involving $200,000 or less in damages;
track two, for cases designated by plaintiff's counsel as involving
$1,000,000 or less in damages; and track three, for all other cases-where
there would be no limit imposed on damages. Choosing either track one

136. See SLOAN ET AL., supra note 26, at 172-73 (demonstrating that litigation cost
varies systematically with the size of the loss and defendant liability).
137. See supra text accompanying note 8.
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or track two would thus set a limit on the maximum amount of damages
potentially payable to the plaintiff. The key point would be that the
limits would be agreed to, rather than imposed. The idea would be to
provide plaintiff with strong incentives for choosing the appropriate
track. To avoid needless costs associated with bargaining, participating
insurers would commit themselves in advance to proceed under track
one or track two, for any case,
if the plaintiff so elects. In outline, such a
138
system might look like this:
Track One. In cases designated by plaintiff's counsel as involving
$200,000 or less in damages, each side would be limited to designating
just one expert to testify at trial. Depositions would not be permitted.
Instead, each party would be required to submit a detailed statement of
their expert's opinion. The expert's testimony at trial would be limited to
the content of the statement submitted. Aggressive discovery scheduling
orders would be used as a way of reaching trial or other resolution in less
than nine months. Use of mediation would be voluntary, available only
if both parties requested it. 139 Track one, in other words, would be a nofrills alternative, in which costs are kept to a minimum.
Track Two. In cases designated by plaintiff's counsel as involving
$1,000,000 or less in damages, each side would be limited to designating
no more than two experts per specialty. Deposition of those experts
would be permitted. Aggressive discovery scheduling orders would also
be a key feature of this track. The goal would be to reach trial or other
resolution in twelve months or less. Mediation prior to trial would be
required. The mediator would be drawn from a panel of mediators with
experience in medical malpractice litigation.
Track Three. For all other cases, the plaintiff's counsel would not be
required to indicate any limitation on the amount of damages to be
sought. Pretrial discovery and case preparation would proceed as they
do at present. However, the benefits of the other two tracks would not
be available either. There would be no limitation on the number or use
of experts, and there would be no assurance of a prompt resolution of the
case. Table 1 below compares the features of the three proposed tracks.

138. There is no magic to these particular dollar amounts. The amount of either or
both thresholds could be altered, up or down. The reasons for proposing thresholds of
$200,000 and $1,000,000 are discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 147-54,
180-84.
139. A number of states require mediation prior to trial. Deborah R. Hensler, Our
Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement Is Re-Shaping Our
Legal System, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 165, 167 (2003). However, there is invariably a
provision allowing the trial court to excuse mediation, for good cause shown, or something
similar. E.g., WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 53.4(c), WL WA R SUPER CT CIV CR 53.4.
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Table 1
Feature
Limits on the
number of experts
Deposition of
experts allowed?
Time to trial

Track One
One

Track Two
Two per specialty

Track Three
None

No-written
statement only
Nine months or less

Yes

Yes

Twelve months or
less

Mediation
required?

No

Yes-mediator to
have a background
in medical
malpractice

Whenever
scheduled by the
court
Yes, if required
under existing law

A. Why Do It?
Not every medical malpractice case requires a full-blown entourage of
experts proffered by the plaintiff and the defendant. Not every case is
complex. Some cases that appear complex need not be. Yet the amounts
expended on case prosecution and defense do not reflect this. Most
malpractice cases are expensive to prosecute or defend, without regard to
the particular issues involved, and without regard to the amount of
money involved.' 40 A key reason why almost all malpractice cases are so
expensive has to do with the fixed costs of medical record review and the
almost inevitable use of experts. In their study of civil trials in California,
Gross and Syverud found that medical malpractice trials typically involve
more expert testimony than all other types of tort litigation, with the
exception of products liability cases. 14 1 For trials conducted in 1990-1991,
the authors reported an average of 5.5 experts per medical malpractice
142
trial. This is often just the visible part of the iceberg. For every expert
who testifies, it is likely that more than that number were consulted or
retained. For at least every expert who testifies (and for some who never
do) it is likely that they have been deposed, with the attendant expenses
of deposition: travel expenses, expert preparation time, attorney time,
and stenographic services.
The current claims resolution system provides little incentive to
control costs. The threshold amounts of $200,000 for track one and
$1,000,000 for track two are intended to sort cases by complexity-using
the amount of money sought as a rough proxy for complexity. To a
lesser extent, a three-track system would also sort cases by the level of
severity of the alleged injury.

140.
141.
142.

See Weiler, supra note 33, at 916; see also Vidmar & Brown, supra note 49, at 32.
Gross & Syverud, supra note 38, at 33.
Id.
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The threshold amounts are meant to include all damages, economic
and noneconomic, as well as attorney fees and costs. Plaintiffs ought to
be able to decide which track to use, in light of their own assessment of
damages. The sorts of classifications and distinctions required by a cap
on just one sort of damage add needless complexity and argument. If the
cap is expressed in terms of noneconomic damages, there will always be
143
some unfairness in their application . It is simpler and wiser to leave the
estimation of damages, of whatever sort, to the plaintiff and her attorney.
Restrictions on the number of experts, elimination or limitation of
expert depositions, and a shortened time to trial are the common
features of tracks one and two. By limiting the number of experts to be
identified and deposed (or, as in track one, eliminating depositions
altogether), the amount required for preparing for trial can be reduced
dramatically. The minimum amount required both to pursue a medical
malpractice action and to defend a medical malpractice action will be
reduced. It makes good sense to do so. The overhead associated with
medical malpractice litigation-specifically, the amount paid lawyers,
experts, economists and others-is famously high. The consensus view is
that less than 50% of all the money spent by insurers on medical
malpractice claims ends up in the pockets of injured patients." Most
observers estimate that between 55% and 60% of all insurer
expenditures go for expenses of one kind or another: plaintiff attorney
fees, defense attorney fees, expert fees, records review, and claims
Much of that money would be better spent
administration. 145
compensating more claimants, or reducing the insurers' costs of doing
business, or some combination of both. Reducing the overhead required
will also improve access to the courts. The high fixed costs involved in
bringing a malpractice lawsuit have the effect of denying access to the
courts for many claimants, whose claims, otherwise meritorious, are
Improving access in
simply "not worth it" in the opinion of counsel.
turn will promote the two fundamental goals of tort law-compensation
and deterrence.
B. Why $200,000?
Cases in which the plaintiff agrees to limit his or her overall recovery
to $200,000 or less would be eligible for track one. The logic for using
143. See supratext accompanying notes 105-10.
144. TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 51, at 15.
145. Studdert et al., supra note 2, at 285-86; Danzon, supra note 17, at 1369; Weiler,
supra note 33, at 915. A 2003 report by Tillinghast-Towers Perrin estimated a net return
to plaintiffs in all personal injury torts (including medical malpractice) of 46%, out of all
defense expenditures. TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 51, at 17.
146. This is not a new phenomenon. See, e.g., Johnson et al., supra note 82, at 1367-68.
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$200,000 as the ceiling for track one is simple. The fixed costs of case
preparation on the plaintiff's side for any malpractice claim are likely to
be at least $50,000.147 Assuming a typical contingency agreement of 33
1/3%, in a $200,000 recovery, the plaintiff would receive between $80,000
and $100,000, depending on whether the fee is taken against the gross
recovery of $200,000, or the net recovery of $150,000 after costs are
recouped. To the extent that costs can be controlled or reduced, the
recovery to the plaintiff would increase, under either scenario.
The fact that a patient's actual injuries might be no more than $100,000
is not a reason to deny the patient compensation from the party
responsible for the injury. Only because we are accustomed to hearing
about much larger medical malpractice verdicts do we think that a lessthan-six figure injury is not substantial. If the context is changed-for
example, from medical malpractice to a "slip and fall" in a local
supermarket-a $100,000 injury seems more impressive.
Much of the overall expense of defending medical malpractice lawsuits
can be attributed to relatively low-dollar cases. A high percentage of
medical malpractice payments are less than $200,000. In 2004, for
example, 14,411 payments on behalf of physicians were reported to the
National Practitioner Data Bank. 4 9 Eight thousand three hundred and
fifty-four of those payments (57.97%) were in an amount less than
The sum of payments of less than $200,000 was
$200,000. 150
approximately $694,140,450, representing 16.34% of all payments
reported to the Data Bank on behalf of physicians in 2004.15' However,
the important number is not the percentage total of all payments
reported to the Data Bank. Instead, the frequency of these relatively
147. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
148. If the attorney's fee is taken from the gross proceeds, the net recovery to the
plaintiff would be computed as follows: $200,000-(1/3 of $200,000)-$50,000 costs - $83,400.
If the attorney's fee is taken from the net proceeds, the recovery to the plaintiff would be

computed as follows: $200,000-$50,000 costs-(1/3 of $150,000) = $100,000. If costs turn out
to be $40,000, rather than $50,000, the net recovery to the plaintiff increases, to either
$93,400 or $106,720, respectively.
149.

SERVS.,

PRACTITIONER DATA BANKS BRANCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN

NATIONAL

PRACTITIONER

DATA

BANK,

at http://www.npdb-hipdb.com/

publicdata.html (Dec. 31, 2004) (on file with the author). The National Practitioner Data
Bank (NPDB) was established by Congress in title 4 of the Health Care Quality
Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3743, 3784 (1986), and codified at 42
U.S.C. § 11131. The Act requires that any amount paid by an insurer on behalf of a
physician must be reported to the NPDB. 42 U.S.C. § 11131 (2000). Whether liability was
ever established is not relevant. There is some reason to suspect that not all such
payments are, in fact, reported. See Joseph T. Hallinan, Doctor Is Out: Attempt To Track
Malpractice Cases Is Often Thwarted, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 2004, at Al.
150. PRACTITIONER DATA BANKs BRANCH, supra note 149.
151. Id.
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small payments is more significant. For virtually every one of these
payments,'52 a substantial amount of money was likely spent prosecuting
and defending the claim. For any lawsuit alleging medical malpractice,
regardless of the amount the plaintiff seeks, there will be substantial
expenses that neither side will be able to avoid, such as the cost of
obtaining and reviewing medical records, the cost of locating and
recruiting potential experts, and the cost of deposing the experts
designated by the other side. On average, costs will be in excess of
$25,000 per case for the defense, and in excess of $50,000 for the
plaintiff.'53 Numbers this large should not be ignored. Because of the
inevitable fixed costs of record review, expert recruitment, and
depositions, low dollar cases are not necessarily cheaper to defend (or
pursue) than high dollar cases. Furthermore, given the ways of pretrial
discovery, and the absence of limits on the number of experts in
particular, a party often has the ability to impose additional costs on the
opposing party. For example, more experts can be designated than will
be needed, requiring additional discovery depositions.
Certainly many, if not most of the low dollar payments reported to the
Data Bank originated as claims that contemplated significantly higher
amounts. Still, the fact remains that in the end, the plaintiff and her
attorney were willing to accept these relatively modest amounts-for
better or worse. The point is, that to arrive at even these modest
amounts in settlement, a large amount of money had to be spent on the
costs of defending and 4prosecuting these cases. The money could be
better spent elsewhere. 1
C. A Cap on All Damages?

The distinction between economic and noneconomic damages is
difficult to rationalize. Some injuries, even though severe, do not usually
lead to significant economic damages.'"5 Some injuries, even though not
152.

Most, but not all payments reported to the NPDB were the result of lawsuits. See

PRACTITIONER DATA BANKS BRANCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH

&

HUMAN SERVS.,

NPDB SUMMARY REPORT (2005), available at http://www.npdb-hipdb.com/pubs/stats/
NPDBSummaryReport.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2005).
153. In 1998 the average cost of defending a medical malpractice case (regardless of
outcome) was $24,669, according to the PIAA. PHYSICIAN INSURERS ASS'N OF AM.,
supra note 33, at 2 (introduction). Even nonpayment cases were expensive; the average
cost of defending nonpayment cases was $20,045. id.; see also supra note 83.
154. The percentage of low dollar payments does appear to be decreasing over time,
however. In 1999 payments of less than $200,000 accounted for 69.2% of all payments
reported to the NPDB. PRACTITIONER DATA BANKS BRANCH, supra note 149. This
pattern is consistent with the view that claims severity has been increasing over the past
several years.
155. See MEHLMAN, supra note 105, at 69-70; Paul Weiler, Fixing the Tail: The Place
of Malpractice in Health Care Reform, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 1157, 1180 (1995); Poisson,
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severe, may often lead to significant economic damages. Unfair results,
particularly when analyzed in terms of vertical equity, seem inevitable.'56
It would be simpler, and wiser, to allow plaintiffs to decide how they wish
to proceed, in light of their own assessment of damages. If the damages
do not seem enormous, and the need for a prompt resolution is present,
then either track one or track two will offer an attractive alternative.
Otherwise, the plaintiff should be free to seek whatever amount she
believes she is entitled to. Injecting the distinction between economic
and noneconomic damages into the process is simply not worth the
effort.
D. What Kinds of Cases?
Payment data from the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB)
offers a glimpse of the types of cases that are likely to fit the parameters
of track one and track two. Beginning in early 2004, the NPDB began to
provide data on severity of the injury alleged, using a nine-level scale
ranging from "1," emotional injury only, to "9," death. Table 2 sets out
the number, average, and median payments made by severity category.
Table 2 also sets out the percentage of cases, within each severity
category, in which less than $200,000 and $1,000,000, respectively, was
paid.
Table 2
157
Payment by Severity Category
n=12,629
Pct. of Cases
< $1,000,000

$37,500

Pct. of
Cases <
$200,000
90.5%

$58,594

$17,500

93.8%

100%

1252

$80,745

$37,500

90.8%

99.7%

1139

$173,727

$105,000

73.5%

99.5%

1535

$175,665

$97,500

73.9%

99.3%

Severity of
Injury

Number of
Cases

Average
Payment

Median
Payment

Emotional
injury only
Insignificant
injury
Minor
temporary
injury
Major
temporary
injury
Minor
permanent

169

$83,124

209

100%

supra note 112, at 783. See generally Studdert et al., supra note 79. Studdert and others
point out, for example, that injuries such as deafness or disfigurement, although severe,
are not usually accompanied by significant economic loss. Id. at 62.
156. See Studdert et al., supra note 79, at 62-63; Weiler, supra note 155, at 1180.
157. PRACTITIONER DATA BANKS BRANCH, supra note 149.
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1987

$331,133

$225,000

48%

96.8%

1317

$482,830

$295,000

34.1%

93.5%

653

$793,484

$495,000

23.6%

87.4%

4158

$279,862

$195,000

55.5%

1 98.5%

Emotional injuries, insignificant injuries, and minor temporary injuries
seem well-suited for track one. Over 90% of the reported awards for
these three categories were less than $200,000. l " Track one might also
prove attractive for many major temporary injury and minor permanent
injury cases. Over 72% of the reported awards for those two categories
were less than $200,000.'

Track two should be attractive to all categories of injury severity, with
the exception of category 8 (quadriplegic, brain damage, lifetime care),
and possibly category 7 (major permanent injury). Only for level 8 does
the percentage of million-dollar cases exceed 10%.' 60 Most death cases
(category 9) should be suitable for either track one or track two. Death
cases represent almost 1/3 (4158/12,629) of the payments reported for
2004.16' The average indemnity payment for death cases was $279,862.162
Only 1.5% of such payments exceeded $1,000,000.163
The choice of what track to use will remain with the plaintiff, of
course. Nonetheless, the data are suggestive. For most injuries, much
time and expense could be saved by opting for track one or track two,
with little risk of forgoing a larger award.
E. More Lawsuits?

Reducing the overhead associated with medical malpractice litigation
cuts both ways, of course. If it will cost less to defend a case, it will cost
less to prosecute a case. A three-track system might therefore increase
the number of lawsuits filed, at least initially. The increase would be
most likely for track one cases-i.e., cases in which the plaintiff seeks no

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

See supra table
See supra table
See supra table
See supra table
See supra table
See supra table

accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying

note
note
note
note
note
note

157.
157.
157.
157.
157.
157.
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more than $200,000 in damages. This might well prove to be a benefit to
all concerned.
It is important to understand a potential $200,000 recovery in context.
Under current practice, even assuming that the full $200,000 is recovered,
the plaintiff's net recovery would likely be not much more than $100,000.
Assuming a minimum of $50,000 in pretrial expenses that will have to be
paid, and assuming a standard contingency fee of 33 1/3%, at most
$83,400 will be left for the plaintiff.'6 If the attorney fees are calculated
on the basis of net recovery (gross recovery, less expenses), the plaintiff's
recovery will be a bit higher-but still no more than half of the gross
amount recovered. If only $100,000 is obtained, the net recovery to the
plaintiff may well be less than $20,000.165 Furthermore, these examples
assume likely liability on the part of the physician. If there is a significant
chance of no recovery, the dollar value of the recovery (if obtained)
would need to be higher, to offset the increased risk of recovering
nothing. It should not be surprising, therefore, that cases valued at
$200,000 or less are precisely the cases that rarely get filed. Given the
high rate of under-claiming by victims of medical negligence, perhaps a
higher volume of low stakes litigation is exactly what's needed.
More lawsuits may be the way to redirect medical malpractice
litigation toward one of the fundamental goals of tort law: compensation.
More lawsuits might mean more payments to more injured people. If
such proved to be the case, it would not necessarily mean greater
payments overall to claimants, due to the effect of the caps agreed to for
track one and track two. The result instead would be greater horizontal
equity among claimants with similar injuries. More importantly, the
possibility of more lawsuits would mean greater access to the courts for
injured patients. At present, for malpractice injuries that cannot be
valued in excess of $200,000, access to the courts is virtually nonexistent.
In order to secure the services of an experienced plaintiffs attorney, the
minimum amount is actually much higher. It is important to understand
that this problem of very limited access exists even in the absence of caps
are introduced, access to the
legislation. When legislatively imposed caps
67
courts becomes even more constrained.1

For claims valued at more than $200,000 but less than $1,000,000, the
availability of track two might also increase the number of lawsuits filed.
Reducing the number of experts, and assuring a resolution of the case
within twelve months would lower the costs and the risks of bringing a

164.
165.
166.
167.

See the computations described supra note 148.
This again assumes $50,000 of expenses and a fee of around $33,000.
See supra text accompanying note 17-18.
See PACE ET AL., supra note 33, at 26.
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lawsuit. As a result, more economically marginal cases might be filed.
Examples would include cases in which liability is uncertain or doubtful,
but damages, if proved, would exceed $200,000; or cases in which
damages probably exceed $200,000, but realistically are worth no more
than several hundred thousand dollars. Cases such as these would
become more attractive to plaintiffs lawyers.
In addition to promoting the tort law goal of compensation, an
increase in the number of lawsuits would promote the goal of deterrence
as well, by improving the signaling process. When a mistake has been
made, followed by an injury, the party allegedly responsible should know
about it. The party responsible should also know the outcome of the
claim. These things happen-eventually -under existing practice. But
they do not happen in predictable fashion, and they do not happen
quickly. Instead, most injuries, even injuries caused by error, do not lead
to a claim, much less a lawsuit. 16 When a claim is made, or a lawsuit is
filed, resolution of the matter is certainly months away, and likely more
than two years away. 69 When the resolution occurs, it will most likely
take the form of either a voluntary dismissal (meaning the plaintiff
simply abandoned the case) or a monetary settlement. Either way, there
has been no determination of fault made by a court. Rarely is either
vindication or condemnation the result for the defendant physician. The
goal of deterrence goes unserved if the message (either vindication or
condemnation) is so seldom sent. Increasing the volume of cases would
change this pattern. There would be more resolutions of all types,
including judgments. Because of the streamlined process required for
tracks one and two, the outcomes would be known sooner.
So where is the benefit to defendants? That benefit appears when
another result of the tracking system is considered: the costs of defending
a claim will be reduced, just as the plaintiff's costs of preparing a claim
will be reduced. There will be less reason to settle to avoid the high costs
of trial. In fact, reducing the costs of defense should have the effect of
reducing, overall, the amount offered by the insurer170 to settle the case.
Reductions in settlement amounts would then follow.
If the case proceeds under either track one or track two, the maximum
amount recoverable will be within the limits of many, if not most medical

168. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
169. See Johnson et al., supra note 82 at 1371.
170. Twenty years ago, Danzon ran a number of simulations to determine the effect on
medical malpractice litigation that a hypothetical 30% reduction in litigation costs for both
sides would have. Danzon concluded that such a reduction would result in a reduction in
average settlement amounts, an increase in the trial rate, and a decrease in the number of
cases dropped without payment by the plaintiff. DANZON, supra note 17, at 48-49.
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liability policies written today.17' With the threat of potential personal
liability removed, there will be less incentive to settle for reasons
unrelated to actual fault. In other words, a defendant who genuinely
feels she has not been negligent will find it easier to resist the temptation
to settle, and instead insist on her day in court. She will not be risking
personal liability for any excess judgment.'
F. More Trials?
Far more malpractice cases settle than ever go to trial. 7 3 Thus, the
effect that a three-track system would have on trial and settlement rates
needs to be considered. There is a possibility that more trials would
result. The reason for this is that for track one and track two cases,
insurers will know that their potential exposure is now limited. Freed of
the risk of excessive awards, insurers might be inclined to offer less than
before for the same sort of injury. The defense wins much more often
than it loses at trial, and everyone knows that.7 4 Even in the face of the
historically long odds that going to trial represents, plaintiffs may still
conclude that they are better off going to trial. The trial preparation will
be less expensive than before, and the time to trial will be reduced. Put
another way, when the transaction costs are reduced, pursuing a case to
verdict makes more sense. Plaintiffs will discount their claims less, and
defendants will make corresponding adjustments to the amount they are
willing to pay in settlement. 7 Still, going to trial will make sense only if
a careful analysis of the merits of the case has been done prior to filing
the lawsuit.
Just as with an increase in filings, an increase in the trial rate would
yield benefits to all. There is reason to believe that plaintiffs pay a
substantial discount from the value of their claims when they agree to
settlement.176 The payments reported to the Data Bank support this
view. In 2004, for example, the median award at trial (as reported to the
In contrast, the median settlement amount was
NPDB) was $265,000.'

171. The most common liability limits written for medical malpractice are $1,000,000
per event, and $3,000,000 per year. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 4, at 6.
172. Most professional liability policies contain a clause requiring the insured's
consent to settle a claim. See Peeples et al., supra note 28, at 880; Kent D. Syverud, The
Duty To Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1172-77 (1990).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
174. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
175. See DANZON, supra note 17, at 48.
176. SLOAN ET AL., supra note 26, at 206-07; see also Stephen Spurr & Walter
Simmons, Medical Malpractice in Michigan: An Economic Analysis, 21 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y & L. 315, 340-41 (1996).
177. PRACTITIONER DATA BANKS BRANCH, supra note 149.
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$165,000.178 Even allowing for the savings to be expected in not going to
trial, the disparity is still striking. 79 A similar result can be found at the
high end of the scale. In 2004, 10.5% of all jury awards were in excess of
$1,000,00080 Only 2.2% of all settlements exceeded $1,000,000. st For
defendants, the prospect of more trials-conducted quickly and at less
expense-might be the most efficient way, over time, to discourage
frivolous lawsuits. The battle will be over the merits of the claim. The
recurring temptation to settle rather than incur defense costs that would
exceed the likely settlement will be lessened.
G. Fewer Large Awards

One of the most frequently cited problems with medical malpractice
litigation is the steady increase in claim severity 2 The trend is especially
evident in the past several years. The size of payments of all typesjudgments and settlements-has increased noticeably.8 The use of the
three-track system should have the effect of reducing the number of
awards in excess of $1,000,000. The restrictions on the use of experts and
the promise of a prompt resolution should be enough to lure some cases
that might otherwise result in a "runaway" jury award into the confines
of track two. For example, imagine a case with a likely settlement value
of $500,000. Under present practice, there is always the possibility that
the plaintiff will come away with an award far in excess of $500,000perhaps $1,000,000, perhaps much more. Both sets of lawyers will be
aware of the possibility of a "jackpot" award. The potential for a very
large award becomes an argument in favor of settlement, that plaintiff's
counsel is likely to invoke-sometimes successfully, sometimes not.
When plaintiff's counsel decides to take advantage of the benefits of
lower pretrial overhead and shorter time to resolution, the possibility of
a very large award disappears. In other words, a three-track system
should have the effect of screening out cases that, objectively viewed, are
not worth seven figures, but, in the hands of a skillful advocate and a
sympathetic jury, just might be. At present, there is no reason not to go
178. Id.
179. It is certainly possible that cases with greater amounts at stake go to trial more
often. One way to test this would be to control for severity of injury in comparing awards
at trial to settlement amounts. In other words, a completely disabling injury might, or
might not, net about the same amount, whether at trial, or in settlement. However, NPDB
data on severity of injury is only available for 2004 forward.
180. PRACTITIONER DATA BANKS BRANCH, supra note 149.
181.

Id.

182. See Studdert et al., supra note 2, at 286; Thorpe, supra note 2, at 21, 23.
183. In 1999 the median payment (judgments and settlements) reported to the NPDB
was $105,000. PRACTITIONER DATA BANKS BRANCH, supra note 149. In 2004 the
median payment (judgments and settlements) reported to the NPDB was $165,000. Id.
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for the jackpot award, at least in the lawsuit's early stages. With a threetrack system in place, there will be good reasons to refrain from going for
the jackpot award. Since jury verdicts provide the key reference point
' restraining the amount of jury verdicts will have a
for
settlements,
moderating
effect8 on
settlement amounts as well.
H. Longer Term Effects

Use of a three-track system would have two beneficial effects with
respect to the behavior of plaintiff's counsel. First, the availability of
different tracks will encourage counsel to value their cases realistically,
from the start of the representation. It will make little sense to "default"
to track three for a case truly worth no more than $200,000; the result
will be needless delay and expense. Realistic case evaluation, early in the
representation, should have the effect of correcting inflated expectations
that the client may have-expectations that may make a settlement
harder to obtain later in the development of the case, when the
weaknesses of the case become apparent. Second, the availability of
different tracks means that counsel will need to discuss the filing options
with the client. That will mean explaining the benefits and the
disadvantages of a less expensive, speedier resolution. It should also
mean that plaintiffs will assume a greater say in the prosecution of their
claims. They will need to decide whether a prompt resolution, with
limited expense but bound by a voluntary cap on damages, is more
desirable than an opportunity, however slight, to recover a larger sum,
with the attendant higher expenses and greater time to resolution. At
present, plaintiffs do not have to make this determination, even though
in many cases an award of less than $1,000,000, or even less than
$200,000, would adequately compensate them for their injury.
L Large DollarCases: Track Three

Of course, there will be cases where the amount of potential damages
is truly in excess of $1,000,000. There will also be very complex cases
that, in the opinion of plaintiff's counsel, require the use of multiple
experts. Nonetheless, there should not be many such cases.
First of all, a review of reports to the NPDB since 1990 shows that
payments of any type in excess of $1,000,000 are quite uncommon;
judgments in excess of $1,000,000 are more uncommon still. In 2004,
97.4% (14,032/14,411) of all payments were for $1,000,000 or less.8 5 Such
184. Daniels & Martin, supra note 43, at 1804-07; Sloan & Hsieh 1990, supra note 26,
at 1026-27.
185. PRACTITIONER DATA BANKS BRANCH, supra note 149. As with payments of
$200,000 or less, this percentage has declined over the past several years. In 1999, 98.5%
of all payments were for $1,000,000 or less. Id.
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payments accounted for 82.4% of all the payments reported to the
NPDB for 2004.' 6 Of those payments, 456 represented jury verdicts;
only forty-eight judgments in excess of $1,000,000 were reported to the
NPDB in 2004.187 Even allowing for the recent increase in severity of
indemnity payments, these numbers indicate that very large payments
still remain very much the rare exception to a more moderate pattern. In
any event, the fact that the median and mean awards are increasing in
amount is all the more reason to provide incentives not to seek such large
amounts, except when plainly warranted. Voluntary caps can provide
such an incentive.
Second, it needs to be understood that true multi-million dollar claims
will often, of necessity, involve defendants other than a physician or two.
Hospitals will likely be co-defendants. The reason for this is pragmatic.
The most common liability limits for a medical malpractice policy are
$1,000,000 per event, and $3,000,000 per year.' Deeper pockets will be
needed, in other words. Yet once hospitals become critical (if not
primary) defendants, the policy issues change. No longer is the concern,
necessarily, driving individual physicians out of practice. It is easy
enough to rally political support for Dr. Marcus Welby; it is a more
difficult task to rally political support for a faceless medical center. Even
more importantly, it is at the institutional level that deterrence might
actually work-not with individual physicians.8 9 We should therefore
aim the cannon in that direction.
J. Effects on Settlement
It is widely understood that in order to settle a lawsuit for, say,
$500,000 the plaintiff must begin by demanding a much higher number,
perhaps even higher than $1,000,000. This is a key feature of the process
of positional negotiation that most lawyers use.' 90 If the maximum award
is now capped at $1,000,000, how does the settlement dance change?
Realistically, an experienced plaintiffs lawyer would agree to a
$1,000,000 cap only if the true "goal" is considerably less than
$1,000,000-and so the defense will assume. Room must be left for the
plaintiff to make concessions. For similar reasons, an insurer wishing to
initiate settlement talks will begin with an offer considerably less than the
amount it is willing to pay-and so the plaintiff's lawyer will assume.
186.

Id.

187.

Id,

188. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 4, at 6.
189. Mello & Brennan, supra note 9, at 1623.
190. See, e.g., HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 47-49
(1982); CHARLES B. CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 15155 (4th ed. 2001).

20051

Learning To Crawl

Does this mean that, in practice, a $1,000,000 voluntary cap will attract
only claims valued by the plaintiff's lawyer as worth, say, no more than
$500,000? That would be an unfortunate result, because it would mean
that fewer cases are being "captured" by this second track. In effect, it
would mean a de facto cap of no more than $500,000-$600,000, where
perhaps a net of $350,000, at most, goes to the injured patient. "1 It
doesn't have to be this way.
A three-track system would change the traditional choreography of the
settlement dance. The effect of choosing track one or track two will be
to reduce the time to trial to twelve months or less. The parties will have
to make a choice: either bargain realistically, or go to trial. In a system
where trial is never more than twelve months away, the opportunity (and
incentive) for posturing and intransigence will be lessened. Knowing that
a bluff can be called in short order, there should be less temptation to do
so in the first place. Use of a three-track system would place the
emphasis in case resolution where it ought to be: on the merits'9
A larger question regarding settlement must also be considered,
however. Most medical malpractice lawsuits are disposed of in one of
two ways. Either they are abandoned unilaterally, or they are settled.
The settlement rate for medical malpractice cases is much higher than
the trial rate. Various studies have estimated the settlement rate, for filed
cases, at around 50%. 93 In contrast, the trial rate is estimated at between
5.8%'V9 and 11%. '95 Would fewer cases settle under a three-track system?
Perhaps so. Twenty years ago, Danzon concluded that a 30%
reduction in litigation costs for both sides would result in more trials and
fewer cases dropped without payment." 6 The effect would be temporary,
however. Over time, lawyers will learn what suits not to bring. A threetrack system rewards plaintiffs lawyers who are adept at picking cases
that have real value, by reducing both the overhead and the carrying
costs associated with malpractice litigation. The system punishes insurers
who refuse to settle cases that should be settled. Under tracks one and
191. I.e., $600,000 gross recovery, less $200,000 contingency fee, and less $50,000 in
expenses.
192. The alternative would be to build in the room needed to stage the settlement
dance. For example, the limits of track one and track two could be doubled, to $400,000
and $2,000,000, respectively. The assumption would be that these two tracks are aimed at
cases realistically valued at $200,000 and $1,000,000.
193. See supra text accompanying note 31.
194. See AM. MED. ASS'N, supra note 2, at 3 (using data supplied by PIAA).
195. See Weiler, supra note 155, at 1163. In any event, there is general agreement that
the trial rate for medical malpractice cases is higher than for other tort claims. See supra
note 30.
196. DANZON, supra note 17, at 48-49.
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two, the incentive for delay is diminished since a prompt trial is assured.
The opportunity to settle on terms more favorable than trial will still
exist, but with a trial in the near future, the opportunity will be shorter.
In the end, the result will be a more efficient and more rational system.
One other benefit to a three-track system should not go overlooked.
This proposal can be implemented without enabling legislation. All it
takes is a willingness to experiment on the part of one or more insurers,
at least some plaintiffs attorneys, and the local trial courts. The details
could be expressed in nothing more elaborate than a discovery
scheduling order. Samples of such orders appear in the Appendices.
VI. CONCLUSION

A three-track system will not, of itself, cure the medical malpractice
insurance crisis. A true cure will require changes much larger than what
is proposed here. Nonetheless, it is a start. Precisely because the
changes that will be required will be substantial, it is unrealistic to think
that they can be adopted with one bold step. When it comes to
malpractice reform, we need to learn how to crawl before we can learn
how to walk.
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APPENDIX:

1

PROPOSED EXPEDITED DISCOVERY SCHEDULING ORDER
(Track One Cases)
THIS MATTER having come on for hearing before the undersigned
presiding Judge, on the date indicated below, and the Court hereby
finding that this is an action alleging medical malpractice;
that the parties wish to bring this action to a prompt resolution, and in
any event within nine months of the date indicated below;
and that the parties have agreed that in no event shall the amount of
money awarded or paid to the plaintiff exceed $200,000;
the Court therefore finds that it would be in the best interest of justice
for an Expedited Scheduling and Pretrial Order to be entered.
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that the parties to this action shall comply with the following
Order:
[ASSUME, for illustration purposes, that the date of the Order is
January 1]
1. The parties shall each be limited to designating a single expert witness.
2. On or before March 1, the Plaintiff shall identify the expert witness
s/he intends to call at the trial of this action.
3. On or before April 1, the Defendant shall identify the expert witness
s/he intends to call at the trial of this action.
4. As used in this Order, the term "identify" when used in the context of
expert witnesses shall mean the furnishing of the following information
about each such expert:
(a) name and address;
(b) training and qualifications (or curriculum vitae);
(c) a detailed statement setting forth the subject matter upon which the
expert is expected to testify, a detailed statement of the facts and
opinions to which the expert is expected to testify, and the basis for each
opinion, including medical records, deposition testimony, and any other
materials the expert has reviewed.
5. All discovery of any nature and description whatsoever shall be
concluded on or before August 1. This case shall be set for trial to begin
on or before October 1.
6. Any expert witness not identified in conformity with this Order shall
not be permitted to testify at the trial of this action. The testimony of all
expert witnesses shall be limited to the information specified in
paragraph 4(c) of this Order.
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7. The parties agree that in no event shall an amount in excess of
$200,000, including both economic and noneconomic damages as well as
attorney fees and prejudgment interest, be paid to the Plaintiff, whether
in settlement or as a result of a jury verdict. In the event of an award in
excess of $200,000, the Plaintiff agrees to accept a reduction in the
amount of the award to $200,000. The parties further agree that in no
event will punitive damages be sought or awarded.
8. Plaintiff agrees to authorize the release of any and all medical records
of the Plaintiff within one week of the date of this Order.
9. The parties agree that the right of the parties to appeal an adverse
judgment or other dispositive ruling shall be unaffected by this order.
10. This Order may be modified by written agreement of all parties.
So ordered, this the 1st day of January, 20_..
Judge
CONSENTED TO:
[Attorney for Plaintiff]
[Attorney for Defendant]
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APPENDIX:

2

PROPOSED EXPEDITED DISCOVERY SCHEDULING ORDER
(Track Two Cases)
THIS MATTER having come on for hearing before the undersigned
presiding Judge, on the date indicated below, and the Court hereby
finding that this is an action alleging medical malpractice; that the parties
wish to bring this action to a prompt resolution, and in any event within
twelve months of the date indicated below;
and that the parties have agreed that in no event shall the amount of
money awarded or paid to the plaintiff exceed $1,000,000;
the Court therefore finds that it would be in the best interest of justice
for an Expedited Scheduling and Pretrial Order to be entered.
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that the parties to this action shall comply with the following
Order:
[Assume, for illustration purposes, that the date of the Order is January

1]
1. The parties shall each be limited to designating no more than two
expert witnesses.
2. On or before March 1, the Plaintiff shall identify the expert witnesses
s/he intends to call at the trial of this action. By March 15, the Plaintiff
shall make such expert witnesses available for any discovery depositions
the defendant may wish to conduct.
3. On or before May 1, the Defendant shall identify the expert witnesses
s/he intends to call at the trial of this action. By June 15, the Defendant
shall make such expert witnesses available for any discovery depositions
the Plaintiff may wish to conduct.
4. As used in this Order, the term "identify" when used in the context of
expert witnesses shall mean the furnishing of the following information
about each such expert:
(a) name and address;
(b) training and qualifications (or curriculum vitae);
(c) a statement setting forth the subject matter upon which the expert is
expected to testify, a summary of the facts and opinions to which the
expert is expected to testify, and the basis for each opinion, including
medical records, deposition testimony, and any other materials the
expert has reviewed.
5. All discovery of any nature and description whatsoever shall be
concluded on or before October 1. This case shall be set for trial to begin
on or before December 1.
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6. Any expert witness not identified in conformity with this Order shall
not be permitted to testify at the trial of this action.
7. The parties agree that in no event shall an amount in excess of
$1,000,000, including both economic and noneconomic damages as well
as attorney fees and prejudgment interest, be paid to the Plaintiff,
whether in settlement or as a result of a verdict. In the event of an award
in excess of $1,000,000, the Plaintiff agrees to accept a reduction in the
amount of the award to $1,000,000. The parties further agree that in no
event will punitive damages be sought or awarded.
8. Plaintiff agrees to authorize the release of any and all medical records
of the Plaintiff within one week of the date of this Order.
9. The parties agree that the right of the parties to appeal an adverse
judgment or other dispositive ruling shall be unaffected by this Order.
10. This Order may be modified by written agreement of all parties.
So ordered, this the 1st day of January, 20.
Judge
CONSENTED TO:
[Attorney for the Plaintiff]
[Attorney for the Defendant]

